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ARTICLES
Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts-
Democratic Values and Judicial Integrity at Stake
John P. Sahl"
[S]urely, virtue is not the ruin of those who possess her, nor is
justice destructive of a state...
INTRODUCTION
Americans, unlike citizens of other nations, are accustomed to
a federal judiciary that plays an active governmental role.2 Since
Marbuwy v. Madison, American courts have provided the ultimate
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1 ARISTOTLE, POLTrICS 145 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943).
2 See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILrIY,
THE GOOD JUDGE 41-49 (1989) [hereinafter TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT]. This report
provides an excellent examination of a wide variety of public policy issues related to the
federal judiciary. The ten-member Task Force consisted of distinguished judges, academics
and political representatives and leaders.
Various writers have acknowledged the "centrality" of the act of judging in law.
AARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 4 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1989); see e.g., GUIDO'
CALABRESi, A COMMON IAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); ROBERT E. KEETON, VEN-
TURING TO Do JUSTICE (1969); cf. PETER H. RUSSELL, THE JUDICIARY IN CANADA: THE
THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 3 (1987) (positing that "Canadians are not conditioned
to think of [their] courts as part of the political system"); R.D. MULHOLLAND, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE NEW ZEALAND LEGAL SYSTEM 10-11 (1972) ("The legal system has been
relegated to a subsidiary role. It is now left to solve those minor secondary problems
which are, from either expediency or indolence, tossed to it from other quarters, or, on
the other hand, to act as a final formal stamp" for decisions which have been made else-
where.").
3 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (asserting federal judiciary's power to review
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forum for the resolution of countless disputes, often making choic-
es that Dean Guido Calabresi describes as tragic.' Despite growing
interest in alternative dispute resolution,' the courts' political role
is likely to become even more important in the future as paralysis
grips the relationship between Congress and the Executive
Branch.' Moreover, the controversy concerning recent Supreme
the constitutionality of actions of Congress and the Executive); cf. Louis Fisher, One of the
Guardians Some of the Time, in Is THE SUPREME COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITU-
TION? 85 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1993) (suggesting that Marbuiy v. Madison is "more mod-
est in scope.... It is just as accurate to say that it is emphatically the province and
duty of the legislative department to say what the law is."). See generally Bernard G. Segal,
Federal Judicial Seleion-Progress and the Promise of the Future 46 MASS. L.Q. 150-51 (1961)
("The final check on public acts, in our democratic system, is the vigorous expression of
public opinion in behalf of worthy ideals. It is essential to our free society that the
American people, lay and professional alike, hold the judgeship in the highest esteem,
that they regard it as the symbol of impartial, fair, and equal justice under [the] law."
(emphasis added)).
4 GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BoBBrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 17-20, 75-76 (1978) (defining
a tragic choice as the allocation of a scarce resource in society which inevitably denies
some individual or segment of society the benefit of the same resource and noting that
courts represent one method for such allocation); see also TWENTIEH CENTURY REPORT,
supra note 2, at 41-49.
5 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 317-18 (1993) (noting that even
with the growth in alternative forms of resolution, the "judicial form . . . retain[s] the
position of dominant importance . . . in our legal culture" because of the institutional
prestige of the courts and the authority that judges exercise over decisionmakers in alter-
native dispute resolution).
6 This gridlock is poignantly reflected in the inability of the executive and legisla-
tive branches to resolve questions such as a woman's right to an abortion, the right to
die, and national health care reform. See Gwen Ifill, Clinton, Defending Health Plan, Attacks
His Critics' Alternatives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1994, at Al (casting opponents of his health
bill as "obstructionists" with no real commitment to universal health coverage, President
Clinton felt "his plan was in danger of being obscured by the rhetoric and the smoke
and the process'" (quoting President Clinton)). Compare Charles Peters, Congress Is Back.
Now, to Lay the Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at A15 (criticizing Republican leaders
for hypocritical obstructionism and causing governmental gridlock) with Bob Dole, Well
Obstruct What Needs Obstructing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at A15 (contending that princi-
pled opposition-and not partisan obstructionism-is basis for gridlock). See generally Rob-
ert Pear, Gridlock, the Way It Used to Be, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, at E4 (positing that the
Founders of the Constitution invented the Senate, "in part, to slow things down and
hold things back," and to act as a check on popular passions and the President-to pro-
mote gridlock).
Finding a solution to the current intergovernmental gridlock is further complicated
by the fact that some experts believe that Congress is seemingly unwilling to address its
own internal gridlock. Tape of Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Annual
Meeting, Legislation Section Program, Unlocking Gridlock: Reform over Substance (Jan.
7, 1994) (discussing Congress' internal gridlock and suggesting that without real structural
reform, for example, limiting the terms of committee chairpersons, there is little reason
to believe Congress will become more responsive to public opinion) (on file with au-
thor); see also TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 21, 41-46; id. at 42 ("Today,
citizens and institutions rely on the federal courts to decide matters primarily left to
(Vol. 70:2
SECRET DISCIPLINE
Court nominations and the release of Justice Thurgood Marshall's
papers suggests that the actions of the courts will be subjected to
ever greater public scrutiny!
Most Americans,' but by no means all,9 believe in the overall
Congress or to the executive.").
7 See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHO rrZ, CONTRARY TO POPULAR OPINION 17-19 (1992) (not-
ing the public "simply doesn't have a clue" about the process behind Judge David
Souter's nomination and criticizing judicial selection processes as not sufficiently merit
based); Adam Clymer, The High Court Is Not Eveybody's Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994,
§ 4, at E5 (United States Senator George J. Mitchell informs President that he is not
interested in Supreme Court seat); Linda Greenhouse, A Choice That Few Are Likely to Op-
pos N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, § 1, at 10 (Judge Breyer had more bipartisan support on
Capitol Hill than other potential nominees for the Supreme Court); see also Anita Hill,
Thomas vs. Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1994, at Ell (discussing developments in public's
understanding of sexual harassment in light of such charges against Judge Clarence
Thomas following his nomination to the Supreme Court and those by Paula Corbin
Jones pending against President Clinton). See generally TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra
note 2, at 23 (stating that the issue of judicial conduct and the proper role of the feder-
al judiciary as a whole "is unlikely to recede").
Public attention is focused regularly on all levels of our national judiciary. See, e.g.,
Neil A. Lewis, Unmaking the G.O.P. Court Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at A9 (noting
that with nearly 130 vacancies, President Clinton has slowly started to change the makeup
of the federal judiciary with the nomination of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Supreme
Court); Anna Quindlen, Justice for Justice Barett, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1994, at A19 (con-
tending that conservative members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have "Thomased"
or delayed for political reasons the confirmation of Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice
Rosemary Barkett to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit); see also Chicago
Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 675 (1994) [hereinafter Seventh Circuit Evaluation] (providing the
public with the first detailed evaluation of the performance of a United States Court of
Appeals by a bar association).
For a good discussion about public concern and occasionally "public outrage" re-
garding the ability of the federal judiciary to engage in self-discipline and how this con-
cern led to the enactment of the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035, (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331,
332, 372, 604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) and related amendments, see Stephen B. Burbank
& S. Jay Plager, Disciplining the Federal Judiciady: The Law of Federal Judicial Discipline and the
Lessons of Social Scienc 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1993). See generally Jeffrey N. Barr &
Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence
Under'the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 29
(1993) (arguing that public scrutiny should involve "systemic empirical examinations" of
the courts, especially for an informed debate regarding the "continuing controversy" of
how to balance the competing values of judicial accountability and judicial indepen-
dence).
8 Sei, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL ("NCJDR"),
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 123 (1993)
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT] ("The system of formal and informal approaches to
problems of misconduct and disability within the federal judicial branch is working rea-
sonably well .... The Commission is not aware of any [other system] that would ...
[accommodate the tension between the core constitutional values of judicial accountability
and judicial independence] as well."); Stephen B. Burbank, Politics and Progress in ImpL-
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integrity of the judiciary and the fundamental fairness of judicial
adjudication. 10 Many Americans perceive the courts not only as
honorable and fair, but also as important guardians of property
and person in an increasingly large, diverse, and often threatening
society." When individual rights clash with majoritarian values or
menting the Federal Judicial Discipline Ac, 71 JUDICATURE 13, 22 (1987) ("[T]he small num-
ber of complaints that have . .. resulted in sanctions are proof, . . . of the high caliber
of the federal judiciary .... The present system is working."). For additional authorities
on this point and an excellent discussion of the informal disciplinary mechanisms avail-
able to judges, see Charles G. Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L
REV. 243, 244 n.3 (1993).
9 See, e.g., DAVID STEIN, JUDGING THE JUDGES 4 (1974) ("[Nlot. .. all judges are
crooked or inept or lazy or arrogant or overly ambitious for political, commercial, finan-
cial, or profession[al] advancement. But enough judges are in one or more of those
categories to make the entire calling properly suspect."); TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT,
supra note 2, at 39 (noting congressional testimony in 1979 regarding the Act's adoption
that charged widespread corruption in the federal judiciary--"amount[ing] to a hidden
national scandal"); Past and Future: Leading Lawyers Offer Views, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 29, 1993,
at 4 (quoting Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School: "The single most impor-
tant suggestion for improving the legal system is upgrading the quality of the judges. Bad
judges have introduced a Greshams's law of incompetence into the legal system under
which the lowest common denominator of intelligence and integrity seems to prevail.");
William G. Ross, The Hazards of Proposals to Limit the Tenure of Federal Judges and to Permit
Judicial Removal Without Impeachment, 35 VILL L. REV. 1063, 1112 n.196 (1990) (suggesting
that "corruption and incompetence among federal judges is more widespread than most
judges would care to admit"); see also Geyh, supra note 8, at 243 n.2, 244 nn.4-5 (citing
additional authorities that question the judiciary's commitment to self-discipline).
10 The judiciary is acutely aware of the importance to the public that judges be fair
and principled in executing their judicial responsibilities. As the Supreme Court stated in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814-16 (1992):
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept
its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in prin-
ciple, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no
bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the
Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circum-
stances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted
by the Nation.
Id. at 2814.
The public's need to perceive governmental institutions as fair and honest is not
limited to the judicial branch. See Time for a Special Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1994, at
A14 (calling for Attorney General Janet Reno to appoint a special prosecutor to investi-
gate President Clinton's banking and investment deals because "self-investigation lacks the
credibility the public has the right to require").
11 See Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional
Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 210 (1993) ("No feature of our public institutional life,
however, is likely more essential to preserving a government of laws than an honorable
and independent judiciary."). See generally Anthony Lewis, A Wening Freedom, N.Y. TwMES,
Oct. 21, 1994, at A15 (suggesting that the Court's reputation for honor and fairness is
internationally recognized as reflected in the Australian High Court's adoption of the
Warren Court's N.Y. Times v. Sullivan opinion concerning libel).
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governmental power, many Americans automatically respond by
seeking redress in the courts.
This basic trust is hardly based on intimate knowledge of the
courts, whose workings are largely mysterious. 2 The mystery no
doubt reflects the complexity and subtlety of the law itself. Yet to
some extent the mystery is the product of successful efforts by
judges to shield their decision-making process from public view.
Secrecy is arguably necessary in some parts of the process."3 Con-
sider, for example, the confidentiality of appellate deliberation,
which facilitates frank and open discussion among the judges.
Unless a judge writes a dissent or concurrence, the public is whol-
ly unaware of the compromises that produced the "unanimous opinion."4
This shroud of mystery surrounds not only the deliberative
12 BARAK, supra note 2, at 3; ARTHUR S. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT: MYrH AND
REAuY 11 (1978); Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections
on Current Pracice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEv. ST. L REV. 385, 388 (1984)
[hereinafter The Role of a Judge]. One popular image of federal judges is that they lead
cloistered lives removed from the world of politics. See Drew E. Edwards, Comment, Judi-
cial Misconduct and Politics in the Federal System: A Proposal for Reising the Judicial Councils
Act, 75 CAL. L REv. 1071, 1072-73 (1987) [hereinafter Judicial Misconduct]; see also MAURO
CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE at ix (1989) ("[Tlhe
judicial process often constitutes the arena for a powerful game of myths and fictions,
such as the myth or fiction of the merely cognitive nature of adjudication."). The history
of the federal judiciary however, contains many examples of judges directly participating
in, if not initiating, political activity. For a brief review of some of the more notorious
political adventures of Supreme Court Justices, see Judicial Misconduct, supra, at 1071 (crit-
icizing the Act as a potential "means of compromising the political independence of
judges, and argu[ing] that judges[' "politics"] should not be scrutinized by their col-
leagues").
13 See MULHOL.AND, supra note 2, at 11 ("In times when the legal system extrap-
olated ideas and values of the upper strata in a highly crystallized society it was possible
to ascribe respect and almost sanctification to the law by making use of a series of myths
and symbols."). See generally CALABRESI & BOBBIT, supra note 4, at 26, 15 (Myths, as well
as "[e]vasion, disguise, temporizing, [and] deception are all ways by which artfully chosen
allocation methods can avoid the appearance of failing to reconcile values in conflict.').
14 ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 10-13 (1990); J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California
Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS UJ. 433, 486 (1994); see also The Role of a Judge, supra note
12, at 422 (compromises are often made in order to achieve unanimity in the issuance
of opinions "[b]ut ... do not always reflect underlying agreement on all portions of an
opinion"). For another example of secrecy in the decisionmaking process, consider the
popular notion that judges write opinions, which overlooks the confidential activities of
law clerks. See KRONMAN, supra note 5, at 329-31, 347-51; id. at 331 (examining the rea-
sons and dangers associated with appellate judges who increasingly defer opinion-writing
to their clerks; cautioning that the shift in the role of appellate judges from author to
editor threatens judicial imagination in deciding cases). This notion promotes the
public's belief in both the industry of judges and the correctness of their decisions. After
all, law clerks are typically new to the legal profession, and they have not been subjected
to the review and confirmation process the Constitution requires.
1994]
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process but also, in the main, the process that ensues when a
federal judge is accused of misconduct. The investigation and the
disposition of most cases are under the sole authority of the fed-
eral courts themselves, and the public is generally completely un-
aware of the proceeding's existence.15
Some courts and commentators contend that, because of the
difficult nature of judging, confidentiality of judicial disciplinary
proceedings is necessary to "shield[] judges from personal harass-
ment and collateral attacks because of their rulings.""6 Confidenti-
ality thus safeguards the quality and independence of the judiciary."
15 See Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal Judges, and How? 149 F.R.D.
375, 391 (1993) (reporting that the Act's process is shrouded in confidentiality and call-
ing for a "careful assessment of issues of confidentiality," id. at 377); COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 8, at 103, 106 (1990 amendments to the Act left unresolved many disputed
issues of confidentiality which have been broadly extended to cover initial stages of the
process); infra Part III A, see also Geyh, supra note 8, at 309. Professor Geyh argues that
the effectiveness of informal methods of judicial discipline, such as peer admonishment,
depends largely on their confidential nature. Given the low number of formal complaints
filed against judges, Professor Geyh notes that such confidentiality contributes to the
public perception that the judiciary is exempt from discipline. Id. at 246. However, he
further contends: "Nevertheless, evidence that informal discipline is administered regularly
and effectively belies the assertion that the small number of complaints culminating in
discipline under the Act translates into a significant volume of unaddressed incidents of
judicial misconduct and disability." Id.
16 Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 797 F. Supp. 1083, 1093 (D. Conn. 1992)
(citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)); First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial
Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 475-76 (3d. Cir. 1986) (en banc); see Harry T. Ed-
wards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for Federal Judges, 87
MICH. L. REv. 765, 793 (1989) (Judge Edwards of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia describes past and present models of judicial disci-
pline as mostly "secretive" or "confidential[]."); see also The Judiciary and Confidentiality,
infra at Part III A & B (discussing the Act's provisions and reasons for confidentiality).
See generally TIWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9. The Task Force recom-
mended that complaints adjudged to be frivolous should remain confidential and that
there be a "general expectation" in favor of disclosure of nonfrivolous complaints. The
Task Force indicated that exceptions to the disclosure of nonfrivolous complaints would
be appropriate occasionally. Id. at 9.
This article, like Judge Edwards', uses the terms "secretive" and "confidential" inter-
changeably to describe a practice of concealing information from general knowledge. See
AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 151 (confidential), 663 (se-
cretive) (1982).
17 See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1263 (2d Cir. 1984), on remand, 592 F.
Supp. 1566 (D. Conn. 1984), affld, 763 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1061 (1986) (court may protect its jurisdiction by enjoining vexatious litigant from filing
suits against court personnel); Justifications for Confidential Self-Discipline, infra part III
B; see also Edwards, supra note 16, at 791-93; cf. Jeffrey M. Shaman & Yvette Bgu, Si-
lence Isn't Always Golden: Reassessing Confidentiality in the Judicial Disciplinary Process, 58 TEMP.
LQ. 755, 765-66 (1985); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 416-
27 (1990). See generally Marcus, supra note 15, at 424-32 (noting that confidentiality under
the Act has a "looming" but "muddled" presence and, although not "prescrib[ing] a
[Vol. 70:2
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This article examines the arguments in favor of a confidential
federal judicial discipline process and concludes that it threatens
public trust in the judiciary. A more open process would be more
conducive to accountability and would better serve the judiciary's
reputation and independence.
Part I briefly describes the decisions of the drafters of the
United States Constitution on critical questions related to judicial
discipline-questions of judicial independence and public account-
ability. The historical review informs the contemporary debate
concerning the judiciary's preference for confidentiality in disci-
plining its members.
Part II outlines the administration of the federal courts and
the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability
Act ("Act") of 1980.' The Act empowers the federal judiciary to
engage in self-discipline.
Part III reviews several provisions of the Act that require con-
fidentiality and the policy reasons traditionally advanced to support
the provisions. The reasons are insufficient, especially in light of
the experience of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit which, until recently, had a more open disciplinary process
than that mandated'by the Act.
Part IV proposes several amendments to the Act to open the
disciplinary process to the public from the moment a complaint is
filed. It also proposes that Congress amend the Act to permit the
filing of complaints or the continuation of disciplinary proceedings
against judges for a reasonable period of time after their resigna-
tion or retirement, and to permit amicus curiae participation.The article concludes by briefly noting that although judges
may prefer secrecy over openness and informality over formality
on matters of internal discipline, 9 the federal judiciary should
nevertheless adopt Oregon's approach to the lawyer disciplinary
process. Oregon has opened that process to public review after the
filing of a complaint. Oregon's experience suggests by analogy that
judicial independence and greater openness and public partici-
pation in the disciplinary process of federal judges are complimen-
resolution," discussing competing confidentiality "interests at stake").
18 The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act has been
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 372, 604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This article address-
es the disciplinary provisions at 28 U.S.C. § 372.
19 See Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 131-33 (many circuits prefer informal reso-
lution of allegations of misconduct); Geyh, supra note 8, at 246 (confidential and'"infor-
mal disciplinary mechanisms are thriving").
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tary rather than mutually exclusive values. Congress should there-
fore adopt the amendments proposed in Part IV, thereby increas-
ing judicial openness and accountability to the public.
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, IMPEACHMENT
AND THE CONSTITUTION
As many commentators have observed, the drafters of the
Constitution sought to balance power among the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches of the federal government." Especially
concerned about the potential for governmental abuse in the
executive and legislative branches, they devoted most of their five
months of deliberation during the Constitutional Convention to a
discussion of those branches. However, Alexander Hamilton and
other delegates were keenly aware of the importance of a strong
and independent judiciary.' The history of the judiciary in Eng-
land as well as in the American colonies shaped their percep-
tion'a that the judicial branch was a necessary check on the
broad powers granted to the executive and legislative branches. 4
20 See, e.g., Paula Abrams, Spare the Rod and Spoil the Judge? Discipline of Federal Judges
and the Separation of Powers, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 59, 61-66 (1991); see also ROBERT A. BURT,
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICr 3 (1992) (asserting that in constitutional interpretation,
an egalitarian conception of authority among the branches is preferable-in principle and
in practice-to judicial supremacy).
21 See BURT, supra note 20, at 56.
22 Alexander Hamilton believed that an independent judiciary would be an "excel-
lent barrier to the encroachments and oppression of the representative body. And it is
the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright,
and impartial administration of the laws." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter FEDERALIST No. 78]; see also Edward
D. Re, Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Con-
duct and Disability Act of 1980, 8 N. Ky. L. REv. 221, 223 (1981) ("[I]t may be said that
without judicial independence, no judge or justice, however well-prepared by qualities of
heart, mind and personal training, can give full effect to the enduring values enshrined
in our Bill of Rights."). See generally BURT, supra note 20, at 4 ("[Alexander]
Hamilton's ... conception of judicial supremacy has been [pre]dominant in our con-
stitutional jurisprudence.").
23 See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 54 (1973) ("To
understand what the Framers had in mind we must begin with English law, for nowhere
did they more evidently take off from that law than in drafting the impeachment provi-
sions."); see also John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional
Provisions, 39 FoRDHAm L REv. 1, 15 (1970) ("The debates at the Constitutional Conven-
tion [in] 1787 clearly reveal that the delegates were familiar with colonial charters, early
state constitutions, and common law traditions and precedents, and were knowledgeable
in the various forms of government. This background particularly influenced them in'
formulating the impeachment provisions of the Constitution.").
24 FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 22.
[Vol. 70:2
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Absent that check, "public happiness, personal liberty, and private
property" would be at risk.'
The drafters viewed the judiciary as the weakest of the three
branches of government.16 They sought to safeguard judicial in-
dependence in Article III by granting judges life tenure' "during
good behavior"' and by prohibiting any reduction in their sala-
ries.'
Additional protection for judicial independence is arguably
found in Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution which contains
the only express provision dealing with official misconduct "The
President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misde-
25 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 139 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
26 FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 22, at 465-66 (asserting that the "judiciary is ...
the weakest of the three departments [of government]"); see BURT, supra note 20, at 54.
See genera/ly MULHOLIAND, supra note 2, at 26 (presenting evidence that courts are weak
in comparison to other governmental bodies in other countries). R.D. Mulholland writes:
[Courts] do not have the power base to rest upon which is available to many
other bodies. In the ultimate[,] their position rests simply upon the respect that
is accorded them by society in general .... It is not uncommon these days to
find that immediately [after] a Court gives a decision somebody, possibly even
the Government, will take action to negate the decision.
Id.
27 FEDERALIST No. 78, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888)
Alexander Hamilton noted:
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as bulwarks of a limited con-
stitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contrib-
ute so much as this to that independent spirit in judges which must be essential
to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
Id., quoted in, Daniel Luchsinger, Committee Impeachment Trials.: The Best Solution?, 80 GEO.
UJ. 163, 165 n.20 (1991).
28 Significant debate exists as to what conduct violates the "during good behavior"
standard. See Robert S. Catz, Judicial Review of Congressional Exercse of Impeachment Pows,
40 KAN. L REV. 853, 856 (1992).
29 "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONSr. art.
III, § 1; see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article IH: Separatingthe Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L REV. 205, 235 (1985) ("By virtue of their tenure and salary
guarantees, Article III judges are constitutionally assured the structural independence to
interpret and pronounce the law impartially."). See generally RUSSELL R. WHEELER & A.
LEO LEVIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE UNITED
STATES (Vincenzo Vigorito ed., 1979) (providing an early and comprehensive discussion
concerning judicial discipline and removal).
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meanors."11 Judges are generally considered "Civil Officers" and
thus subject to removal by impeachment."1 The House of Repre-
sentatives has the "sole power of Impeachment" and proceeds like
a grand jury.-2 After receiving Articles of Impeachment from the
House,' the Senate has the "sole power to try all impeach-
ments."' I
Scholars have, however, debated vigorously the issue of wheth-
er impeachment under Article II, Section 4 is the only constitu-
tionally permissible method of judicial discipline.s Participants in
this debate fall generally into two camps. One group contends that
the Framers intentionally established impeachment as the sole
means of removing and disciplining judges.' This contention
finds a firm foundation in the discussion of the Constitutional
30 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Im-
peachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx. L REV. 1 (1989); Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unneessaty
and Improper The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94
YALE UJ. 1117, 1118 (1985); see also Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun ControL Preserving
Impeachment as the Exclusive Removal Mechanism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1209
(1991) (suggesting that impeachment process is too cumbersome to serve as an effective
tool for judicial discipline and recommending the Act as an alternative). See generaly
Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A Hisoiy of Federal Judicial Service-and
Disservice-1789-199, 142 U. PA. L REV. 297 (1993) (examining the 190 resignations of
federal judges over the last 200 years for reasons other than health or age, and explor-
ing the relationship between accountability and judicial independence in the context of
resignations occurring under the threat of or during governmental investigations of
judges' conduct).
31 See Catz, supra note 28, at 855 (citing United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11, 16 (1955)); Grimes, supra note 30, at 1211, n.8.
32 See Catz, supra note 28, at 856.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 For a sample of the publications favoring the Act's constitutionality, see Carol T.
Rieger, The Judicial Councils Reforn and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges Judge
Judges?, 37 EMORY L.J. 45, 57 (1989); Shane, supra note 11, at 209-10; see also Patrick D.
McCalla, Judicial Disciplining of Federal Judges is Constitutiona4 62 S. CAL. L REV. 1263,
1288-89 (1989) (the only unconstitutional provisions of the Act would be suspending a
judge's calendar or removing a judge from office; the latter provision has been largely
eliminated). Some works criticizing the constitutionality of the Act include: Abrams, supra
note 20, at 100; Baker, supra note 30, at 1118; cf. Interview with Akhil Reed Amar, Pro-
fessor of Law, Yale Law School (June 17, 1994) (judges have no vested constitutional
right to their docket or calendar because the Constitution only protects a judge from
having his salary or compensation reduced).
36 Abrams, supra note 20, at 95 ("The Framers [of the Constitution] mandated life
tenure for judges, subject to impeachment for great offenses, precisdy to reduce the po-
tential of corruption inherent in extensive public accountability."); see Baker, supra note
30, at 1139-40. See generaly Grimes, supra note 30, at 1254 ("Impeachment is an impor-
tant safeguard for judicial independence because it involves the Congress in a removal
process that may occasionally be inspired by vengeful or self-promoting prosecutors or
the parochial politics of the judiciary.").
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Convention delegates. 7 Its proponents argue that the cumber-
some impeachment process safeguards judicial independence by
protecting judges from political and other external pressures.'
Realistically; lines of "neat distinction between political and disci-
plinary responsibility" cannot be drawn, and the consequences of
error are not worth the risk of "chilling judicial independence." 9
The opposing camp argues that the Framers never intended
impeachment to be the sole method of judicial discipline. Profes-
sor Raoul Berger, for example, writes that the "'good behavior'
[clause] was employed to guard against legislative and executive
tampering with the judiciary, not to insulate judges from removal
when they misbehaved."' Similarly, Professor Akhil Amar reads
the impeachment provisions as "providing a political mechanism
for punishing judges that suppLements, but does not supplant, the
ordinary modes of criminal punishment."4' This view is supported
37 See Philip Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes fiom
Histoiy, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 665, 668 (1969); Martha A. Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the Amer-
ican Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969 SiP. Cr.. REv. 135, 152; see also
Abrams, supra note 20, at 75 (debates at Constitutional Convention "strongly suggest that
'good Behavior' was intended to describe life tenure subject to impeachment, and was
not intended as a separate standard of conduct authorizing removal or discipline by a
means other than impeachment"); Edwards, supra note 16, at 774-77 (arguing impeach-
ment is the only constitutional method to remove judge and that the "good behavior"
clause permits discipline by nonimpeachment methods providing removal is not an op-
don).
38 TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 65; see Abrams, supra note 20, at
83, 84 n.160 (The House has initiated over 50 impeachment investigations and has issued
Articles of Impeachment against 15 officials. Thirteen of those officials have been judges
and seven of them have been convicted and removed.); see also Grimes, supira note 30, at
1214 n.32; JOSEPH BORIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 219-58 (1962).
39 See Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE LJ. 681, 715 (1979)
(barring impeachment, judiciary's freedom from political accountability enhances democra-
cy because it can check abuses by other branches); see also CAPPELLETTI, supra note 12, at
107. History supports the notion that political accountability for the courts is sometimes
used as an instrument for judicial repression and oppression. Id. at 106 n.215 (citing a
national report by Augusto M. Morello et al. submitted to the Eleventh International
Congress of the Academy of Comparative Law, "concerning the recurrence since 1930 in
Argentina . . . 'una depuraci6n des los quadros del Poder Judicial', with the removal of
those judges who are not submissive to the regime").
40 See BERGER, supra note 23, at 165. Professor Berger further writes: "Judicial inde-
pendence, in short, rises no higher than the 'good behavior' tenure in which it is ex-
pressed. And the separation of powers only guarantees, it does not alter, the tenure se-
cured by 'good behavior'; much less does it exclude the judciay from removing a judge
who has misbehaved." Id.; see also Grimes, supra note 30, at 1255 (Act offers vehicle for
disciplining judges, except in case of removal where impeachment process is preferable
but requires reform).
41 Akhil Reed Amar, On Judicial Impeachment and Its Alternatives-Remarks Pre-
pared for the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 4-5 (Dec. 18,
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by considerable evidence from the founding and ante-bellum
eras.' Amar also notes that writs of mandamus and appellate re-
view are traditional mechanisms for regulating judicial behavior,
which further suggests that the Framers never intended impeach-
ment to be the sole method of regulating judicial conduct."
Members of this camp also contend that impeachment is too
cumbersome to be an effective mechanism for disciplining judg-
es. 44 They cite the decline in House impeachment investigations
as strong evidence of this point.' The recent Senate impeach-
ments and removals of Federal District Court Judges Harry
Claiborne," Alcee Hastings,4' and Walter Nixon" support this
1992) (on file with author). According to Professor Amar, Congress is free to pass crimi-
nal laws that apply only to judges and that call for their removal or disqualification. Id.
at 5; see HEARINGS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL
342-43 (1993) [hereinafter NCJDR HEARINGS]; see also Todd D. Peterson, The Role of the
Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of Federal Judges, 1993 U. ILL L. REv. 809,
895 (concluding that pre-impeachment prosecutions are constitutional).
42 Maria Simons, Bribery and Other Not So 'Good Behavior," Criminal Prosecution As a
Supplement to Impeachment 94 COLUM. L REV. 1617, 1634-52 (1994).
43 See NCJDR HEARINGS, supra note 41, at 344-45; see also Interview with Akhil Amar,
supra note 35 (Professor Amar believes the Act is "basically akin to appellate review, akin
to administrative discipline .... where 'you are not taking away someone's salary, divest-
ing a vested right.'").
Writs of mandamus and appellate review are essentially public methods of regulating
judicial conduct. Their public nature supports this article's theme that completely open-
ing the Act's disciplinary process to public review furthers the goals of judicial integrity
and judicial independence.
44 Thomas Jefferson described impeachment as a "bungling way" for removing judg-
es. Grimes, supra note 30, at 1210 n.3 (citing WILLIAM PLuMER, LIFE OF WILIAM PLUMER
325 (1857) (quoting Jefferson's remarks to Plumer)). The combined impeachment pro-
ceedings of both the House and Senate take anywhere from six months to as long as
two and one-half years for completion as in the Hastings case. Id. at 1226.
45 Id. at 1216 (In the last fifty years, the chances of a "federal judge being subject
to a congressional impeachment investigation have become remote: on average, for every
hundred authorized judgeships, there were only two impeachment investigations every fifty
years."). Professor Grimes illustrates the remoteness of impeachment investigations in the
following chart:
Periods Impeachment Tudgeships Investigations to
Investigations (at 26th year) Tudgeships
1790-1839 17 28 (1815) .61
1840-1889 12 63 (1865) .19
1890-1939 23 146 (1915) .16
1940-1989 7 407 (1965) .02
Id.; see also Van Tassel, supra note 30, at 336 n.14 (since 1789 Congress has impeached
only 13 judges and removed only 7; in the 1930s Congress increasingly relied on Justice
Department investigations or other pressure to remove misbehaving judges).
46 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF HARRY
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argument because they were expensive, time-consuming49 and po-
litically unsettling for the legislative branch as well as for the judi-
ciary.' One commentator estimates that in Judge Hastings's case,
the cost of the investigation by the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit and the House exceeded $2 million.51
E. CLAIBORNE, S. Doc. No. 48, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 289-97 (1986); see Claiborne v. Bur-
ger, 790 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984). See generally, Judge Aguilar Found Guilty on 2 Charges, LA.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1990, at Al, A2 (suggesting that another impeachment may occur with
U.S. District Judge Robert Aguilar's conviction and noting that impeachment by the
House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate "could take months, even years.").
47 Although a court acquitted District Court Judge Alcee Hastings of conspiracy
charges, the Senate successfully impeached him iff 1989 for perjury and conspiracy to
obtain a bribe. REPORT OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMM. ON ARTICLES AGAINST JUDGE
HASTINGS, S. REP. No. 164, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1989); see Hastings v. United States
Senate, 716 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated on grounds of ripeness, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
48 Chief Judge Walter F. Nixon of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi was impeached in 1989. REPORT OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMM.
ON ARTICLES AGAINST JUDGE WALTER NIxON JR., S. DOC. No. 164, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1989); see also Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
49 For a more detailed description of the time and cost involved in the impeach-
ment proceedings of Judge Claiborne and Judge Hastings, see Grimes, supra note 30, at
1224-25. The Hastings impeachment was more complicated than the Claiborne impeach-
ment and consisted of a two-year House investigation involving nine Judiciary Committee
employees, five of whom were lawyers. The Hastings impeachment produced a House
record of 4800 pages. Id. at 1225 n.91. After reassigning employees and making substan-
tial additions to the staff for the Hastings trial, 55 witnesses testified over the course of
18 days before the 12 member Senate Trial Committee, producing a record of 6000
pages. The Trial Committee also devoted considerable time to pretrial matters, ruling on
various discovery motions and issuing seven pretrial orders. Of course, substantial money
was spent on all parties' legal fees.
The House investigation and impeachment process is lengthy compared to the aver-
age Senate trial, which takes between 16 days and 6 weeks. TETNTIEH CENTURY REPORT,
supra note 2, at 65. The combined impeachment proceedings of both the House and
Senate take anywhere from six months to as long as two and one-half years for comple-
tion as in the Hastings case. Grimes, supra note 30, at 1226.
50 Many Members of Congress and the public were troubled by the fact that Judges
Nixon and Claiborne, who were convicted of felonies, continued to receive full salary and
benefits until they were finally removed through the impeachment process. COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 8, at i; see also Dan Morain, Judge Sentenced for Aiding Mobster, LA.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1990, at A3. This article reports that "until Congress impeaches [U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Robert Aguilar], which is the only way to oust him from what is otherwise a
lifetime position" he will continue to draw his $97,570 salary. Judge Robert Aguilar "be-
came only the third federal judge sentenced to a federal prison" and the first from Cali-
fornia. He was sentenced to 6 months in prison plus a $2,100 fine and 1,000 hours of
community service for obstructing justice. The other two judges are Walter Nixon of
Mississippi, sentenced to five years imprisonment in 1986 for perjury and Harry Claiborne
of Nevada, sentenced to 18 months imprisonment in 1984 for income tax evasion.
51 Grimes, supra note 30, at 1225 n.90.
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The perceived costs and delays of recent impeachments per-
haps explain why the impeachment process had not been used
since 1936.52 Moreover, Congress believed that future judicial mis-
conduct was likely, due to the ever-increasing number of judges.'
Thus, in the late 1970s Congress sought a legislative alternative to
impeachment to ensure greater public accountability by judges
and to ease the burdens on the House and the Senate by facilitat-
ing development of a record in impeachment cases.' The legisla-
tion was likely to be evaluated in light of the ongoing debate
about whether impeachment is the exclusive constitutional method
to remove and discipline judges. This debate is symptomatic of a
much more profound and fundamental tension: the need for a
judiciary that is both independent and publicly accountable.'
Looming like a large cloud, this constitutional debate promises to
cast a shadow over discussions about specific disciplinary provi-
sions, such as the Act's requirement of confidentiality.' Although
a complete discussion of the Act's constitutional validity as a
means of judicial self-regulation is beyond the scope of this article,
it is important to note that several federal courts and scholars
believe the Act is constitutional.7
52 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 4-5.
53 Id. at 4. To a limited extent, this belief is supported by the recent felony con-
victions of Judge Robert P. Aguilar of the Northern District of California in 1990 and of
Robert F. Collins in the Eastern District of Louisiana in 1991. For a good discussion of
these two cases and the three impeachments in the 1980s see Todd D. P eterson, The Role
of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of Federal Judges, in I RESEARCH PAPERS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 243, 266-75 (1993)
[hereinafter RESEARCH PAPERS].
54 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
55 BERGER, supra note 23; see also Kurland, supra note 37, where the author states:
It should be kept in mind that the provisions for securing the independence of
the judiciary were not created for the benefit of the judges, but for the benefit
of the judged. It is not in the keeping of the judges to surrender this independence
under pressure or voluntarily to give it away. Judicial independence is held in trust
for the people and only they should determine whether they would like to ex-
change some judicial independence for more judicial efficiency.
Id. at 698 (emphasis added).
56 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 20, at 66-72; Baker, supra note 30, at 1125; Melissa
H. Maxman, Note, In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 420, 451-53 (1987).
57 Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-17;
Shane, supra note 11, at 24042. In addition, the recent amendment limiting the "remov-
al" of judges to congressional impeachment has rendered the Act less vulnerable to the
charge of unconstitutionality. See id. at 239; Judicial Misconduct, supra note 12, at 1088.
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II. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE
FOR JUDICIAL SELF-REGULATION: THE JUDICIAL COUNCILS REFORM
AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILnY ACT
OF 1980 IN A NUTSHELLP
A. Judicial Administration
The Judicial Conference of the United States and the judicial
council in each of the twelve federal circuits have primary respon-
sibility for the administration of the modem judicial bureaucra-
cy-" These administrative bodies will largely determine the suc-
cess of any judicial self-regulatory regime established by Con-
gress.' The Judicial Conference, which meets annually, oversees
the operation of the entire judiciary.61 The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court chairs the Conference, which consists of all of the
chief circuit judges and one district judge from each circuit cho-
sen by that circuit's district and circuit judges.62
The judicial council is the central governing body within each
circuit and is statutorily empowered to "make all necessary and
appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration
of justice within its circuit."63 The chief circuit judge presides
over the council, which meets at least twice a year and is com-
prised of an equal number of circuit and district judges.' Coun-
cil members serve for limited terms which are determined by the
majority vote of all active judges in the circuit..
58 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 372, 604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
59 Baker, supra note 30, at 1118.
60 See generally TlNTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 44 (In light of the
courts' lack of administrative expertise, "[t]he capacity--and the right-of the judiciary to
govern is open to debate." (citing Stanley C. Brubaker, From Incompetent Imperialism to
Principled Prudence: The Role of the Courts in Reatoing "the State" 10 HASTINGS CONST. LQ.
81, 89-95 (1982))).
61 28 U.S.C. § 331 (the Chief Justice may call special sessions of the Conference);
see Baker, supra note 30, at 1118-19.
62 28 U.S.C. § 331. The district judge is elected at the annual judicial conference of
each circuit which meets to advise the chief judge of each circuit of "means of improv-
ing the administration of justice within such circuit." Id. § 333; see Baker, supra note 30,
at 1118-19 nn.16-17.
63 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1); see Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 33 n.17.
64 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1); see Barr & Willging, supro note 7, at 33 n.17.
65 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(2); see Baker, supra note 30, at 1119.
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B. Judicial Discipline and Administration Before the Act
Before Congress promulgated the Act in 1980, impeachment
and removal was the only formal process for disciplining federal
judges.' Other constraints-individual and institutional, formal
and informal-have traditionally operated as a check, short of
discipline, on judicial misbehavior.' For example, judges are sub-
ject to the criminal process and to the system, of appellate review,
which permits courts to address some forms of misconduct and
correct some errors.' Prior to the Act's passage, the chief judge
of the circuit resolved most complaints about federal judges infor-
mally and secretly.' In the absence of formal disciplinary mecha-
nisms, peer influence played a key role in deterring misconduct or
preventing its recurrence."0
During the early 1900s, judges of each circuit began meeting
annually and informally to facilitate communication among the
various levels of an increasingly large judicial bureaucracy."' In
1922, Congress established the Judicial Conference, which "added
an in-house dimension to judicial administration."' Yet both the
Attorney General of the United States and the Department of Jus-
66 See Geyh, supra note 8, at 243; see also TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note 2,
at 4 (prior to the Act, the "major mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning federal
judges" included impeachment and judicial socialization).
67 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-3. For over 200 years, "various mechanisms
have evolved to ensure the responsibility of individual judges and of the federal judiciary
as a whole. These include the appointment process, judicial socialization, ethical restraint,
recusal and disqualification, precedent, legal doctrines, individual liability, review of judi-
cial decisions, and congressional oversight under the Constitution and by statute." TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 51; see also Beth Nolan, The Role of Judicial Ethics
in the Discipline and Removal of Federal Judges, in I RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 53, at 867-
934 (discussing the role of judicial ethics in the regulation of judicial conduct).
68 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 2 ("Although rarely invoked against sitting
federal judges until recently, the criminal process has always been available, and its
threat, sometimes in combination with an impeachment investigation, has induced a num-
ber of corrupt judges to resign.").
69 Abrams, supra note 20, at 94-95; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career
Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of Federal Judges, 76 KY. LJ. 643, 656 (1988) (noting
that before the Act probably "collegial or hierarchical suasion was the most common and
effective supplement to the impeachment process").
70 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 2; see also Geyh, supra note 8, at 243, 245,
258 (indicating that some private and informal disciplinary mechanisms, such as peer
pressure, that existed before the Act are still "thriving").
71 See Baker, supra note 30, at 1120.
72 Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 838 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 331 (1982)); see Baker, supra note 30, at 1120 n.23.
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tice still primarily controlled the administration of the courts. 5
The Administrative Office Act of 1939 institutionalized the
informal intercircuit meetings of judges and officially established
judicial councils74 in each circuit to transfer the administration of
federal courts from the Department of Justice to the judiciary.'
Only circuit judges are members of these administrative bodies.'6
The Administrative Office Act of 1939 authorized the councils to
take such "'action... as may be necessary'" to ensure "'that the
work of the district courts shall be effectively and expeditiously
transacted. '"' Congress amended this charge in 1948 to require
the councils to "make all necessary orders for the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts."' The
councils broadly construed this language to empower them to take
any action necessary to maintain public confidence in the federal
courts, including regulating judges' behavior.79 Thus, the councils
attempted to resolve complaints about judicial misconduct effi-
73 See Baker, supra note 30, at 1120 n.23.
74 Administrative Office Act, ch. 501, §§ 306-07, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224-25 (1939) (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1982)); Baker, supra note 30, at 1120. The 1939
Act also established circuit conferences that included district judges as members. Act of
Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223.
75 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 375 (noting that except for impeachment, the dis-
cipline of federal judges was part of the general administrative responsibilities of the
judicial councils under 28 U.S.C. § 332, adopted in 1939). See generally PETER G. FISH,
THE PoLTrics OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 40-165 (1973) (attributing the 1939
Act to: the 1936 impeachment trial of District Judge Halsted Ritter, a campaign by the
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits to separate appellate court funding
from the Department of Justice; and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes's proposal to
decentralize judicial administration by creating a supervisory council in each circuit, in
part to improve the regulation of judicial misconduct, delay and disability).
76 See 28 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1). Given the hierarchial character of the federal judiciary,
district judges and others have struggled to increase their representation on both the
councils and the Judicial Conference. See Geyh, supra note 8, at 260 n.63. In 1980, the
council membership of circuit judges was broadened to include a minimum of two or
three district judges, depending on the size of the circuit's council. 28 U.S.C. §
332(a)(10)(C)(i)-(ii) (1988). Currently an equal number of circuit and district judges
serve on each council with the total number of council members determined by a vote
of all active judges in a circuit. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
77 See Baker, supra note 30, at 1120-21 (quoting Administrative Office Act ch. 501, §
306, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1982))); see also Geyh,
supra note 8, at 261 (noting that the broad powers of the council provide for an effec-
tive and efficient judicial administration under the 1939 Act).
78 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 332, 62 Stat. 869, 902 (1948) (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1988)). The current Act describes its primary goal
in language similar to the 1948 amendment. See infra text accompanying note 101.
79 See Baker, supra note 30, at 1121; Geyh, supra note 8, at 260, 262.
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ciently and fairly.8"
Although the councils were confronted with a full "gamut of
problematic behavior" during the period between the Administra-
tive Office Act of 1939 and the Act's adoption in 1980,1 they
rarely issued orders dealing with misconduct 2 Instead, council
orders addressed judicial behavior involving judicial inaction or
delay. 3 This paucity of orders regarding misconduct resulted
from the perception that those orders threatened judicial indepen-
dence, that the legislation creating the councils provided insuffi-
cient guidance regarding the scope of the orders, and that some
chief judges were insufficiently interested in administration to
encourage orders.84
In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in Chandler v. Judi-
cial Council of the Tenth Circuit left in doubt the councils' power to
discipline Article III judges and raised concerns about the inde-
pendence of individual judges.' In Chandler, the Tenth Circuit's
council disciplined a circuit judge by eliminating his docket, an
action which effectively removed him from office.86 The Supreme
Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the Administra-
tive Office Act of 1939 and the Tenth Circuit's disciplinary actions,
holding that Judge Chandler had waived any constitutional claims
when he voluntarily acquiesced in his sanction. 7 Moreover, al-
though the Court "recognized the validity of limited judicial man-
agement authority, " ' it cautioned that such authority to intervene
in a judge's affairs is circumscribed by "the constitutional require-
ment of judicial independence."89 The Chandler ruling provided
little inspiration for councils to issue orders disciplining judges.'
80 See Geyh, supra note 8, at 263-64.
81 Id. at 264.
82 For a good discussion of judicial misconduct and the councils' activities during
this period, see id. at 263-71; see also FISH, supra note 75, at 418 (noting that "[f]6rmal
orders from the council to a ... judge are, however, very much the exception").
83 See Geyh, supra note 8, at 263-71.
84 Id. at 265-67.
85 398 U.S. 74 (1970); see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 2-3; Burbank, supra
note 69, at 655. For a discussion of Chandler, see Gerhardt, supra note 30, at 70-73.
86 See Baker, supra note 30, at 1121.
87 Chandler, 398 U.S. at 80-81; see'Baker, supra note 30, at 1121-22.
88 Abrams, supra note 20, at 93.
89 Id. (quoting Chandler, 398 U.S. at 85).
90 In his dissent, Justice Douglas wrote, "there is no power under our Constitution
for one group of federal judges to censor or discipline any federal judge and no power
to declare him inefficient and strip him of his power to act as a judge." Chandler, 398
U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Geyh, supra note 8, at 270 (noting that
Chandler did not resolve the still open question of whether an aggrieved judge can obtain
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After Chandler, and in the wake of Watergate, members of
Congress again sought to enact formal disciplinary mechanisms for
the federal judiciary similar to those that some states had adopt-
ed.91 Attempting to respond to changing societal expectations and
to avert legislation, the judiciary adopted the Code of Conduct for
the United States Judges in 1973. Additionally, the judiciary fol-
lowed the Judicial Conference's recommendation that circuit coun-
cils adopt rules to provide a disciplinary mechanism within the
judiciary.' Nevertheless, Congress determined that legislation was
necessary because Chandler left in doubt the power of the councils
to engage in effective self-regulation and raised concerns regarding
the independence of individual judges. 3 Legislators were aware
of dissatisfaction with the constitutional provisions for the removal
of judges." They were also cognizant of the concern that a signif-
icant amount of judicial misconduct and disability was being ig-
nored and of the inadequacies in some of the councils' procedur-
al rules.95
C. The Act in a Nutshell
The Act was the result of compromises both within Congress
and between Congress and the federal judiciary." Congress
adopted the Act principally to assure public accountability but also
to provide a formal and effective supplement to the impeachment
process for resolving complaints of misconduct or disability." The
judiciary expressed its concern that any such supplement "not
prove to be a cure worse than the disease."" "[B]elieving that
judicial review of a council's order or whether the councils can petition the courts for a
writ of mandamus to compel judges to comply with its orders).
91 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 3; see Marcus, supra note 15, at 375.
92 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
93 Id.
94 See Burbank, supra note 69, at 64445.
95 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 3; Geyh, supra note 8, at 243.
96 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. Excepting Supreme Court justices, the
Act applies to all circuit, district and bankruptcy judges and magistrates. See 28 U.S.C. §
372(c) (1). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Coun-
dils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L REV. 283, 283-85,
291-308 (1982) (providing an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the Act and
identifying some of its structural weaknesses).
97 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 3-4, 85. See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Bu-
reaucratization of the Judiciay, 92 YALE LJ. 1442, 1445 (1983) (the 1980 Act "stands as a
symbol of the weakness of the controls of one judge over another" and it neither in-
creases bureaucratization nor threatens judicial independence).
98 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
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misconduct was not widespread, and sensitive to [the need for]
both institutional and individual judicial independence," Congress
passed the Act-."a charter for Ijudicial] self-regulation" modeled
on one that judges had devised. 9 Thus, the Act reflects an ad-
ministrative rather than punitive orientation towards judicial disci-
pline and leaves the judicial circuit councils with primary responsi-
bility for judicial discipline."0° Nevertheless, Congress and others
regarded the Act as an experiment that would require vigorous
congressional oversight.'
For the first time, the Act provides the judiciary with a formal
process for internally handling complaints about judicial behav-
ior."2 It establishes specific procedures for circuit judicial coun-
cils and the Judicial Conference to follow when disciplining Article
III judges. Although Congress enacted the measure in 1980, both
the Act's constitutionality and the efficacy of some of its provisions
remain fertile ground for commentary. 03 Congress amended the
Act in 1988 and 1990, and two major studies have evaluated it.' °"
The Act's goal and substantive conduct standard is simple and
far reaching: promoting the "effective and expeditious administra-
tion of the business of the courts.""5 In Hastings v. Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit rejected a claim by Federal District Judge Alcee Hastings
that the Act's goal created a standard of judicial conduct that was
unconstitutionally overbroad.' The court concluded that the Act
was directed primarily against judicial misconduct and decided that
99 Id.
100 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 375.
101 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
102 28 U.S.C. § 372(c); see Marcus, supra note 15, at 375.
103 See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct Could Be Mis-Regula-
tion, 89 MICH. L. REv. 609 (1990); Edwards, supra note 16; see Marcus, supra note 15, at
376 (There are "various assertions about whether the judiciary has taken a serious ap-
proach to . . . self-discipline imposed by the Act.").
104 In 1989, the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force prepared the first study, entitled
The Good Judge. The Twentieth Century Fund is a not-for-profit and nonpartisan research
foundation providing analysis of economic, political and social issues. See TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY REPORT, supra note 2. Congress authorized the second study in 1990 to "study prob-
lems and issues involved in the tenure (including discipline and removal) of our Article
III judges." Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 410, 104 Stat. 5122 (1990) (requiring a report that
would identify problems regarding discipline and removal and that would "evaluate the
advisability of proposing alternatives to current arrangements"). See COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 8, at 115 (discussing amendments).
105 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1); see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 94.
106 829 F.2d 91, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recommending impeachment after combining
investigatory and adjudicatory functions under Act is constitutional).
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it was closely enough tailored to the end of preventing misconduct
to avoid a violation of the First Amendment. 07 In 1986, a special
committee of the Conference of Chief Judges indicated that "mis-
conduct" under the Act included the "use of the judge's office to
obtain special treatment for friends and relatives, acceptance of
bribes, improperly engaging in discussions with lawyers or parties
to cases in the absence of representatives of opposing parties, and
other abuses of judicial office."'
The Act prescribes in general terms the process for the filing
and initial processing of a complaint."° The Act expressly re-
quired that the rules of each circuit judicial council provide proce-
dural protection for judges and complainants, -and that the rules
be a matter of public record."0 In addition, it was clear from
the Act's background and legislative history that Congress expect-
ed the judicial councils in each circuit to revise their existing
107 Hastings, 829 F.2d at 105; see also In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by
an Investigating Committee, 783 F.2d 1488 (lth Cir. 1985) (investigative committee's use
of subpoena power in recommending impeachment is constitutional and consistent with
right of House of Representatives to initiate impeachment), ert. denied, 477 U.S. 904
(1986); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 593 F. Supp. 1371 (D.D.C.
1984), affd in part and vacated in par 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Act is constitu-
tional although case not ripe for review), cert. denie4 477 U.S. 904 (1986); In re Petition
to Inspect & Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d 1261 (11th Cir. 1984).
108 SPECIAL COMM. OF THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUDGES OF THE U.S. COURTS OF Ap-
PEALS, ILLUSTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILI-
'Y WITH COMMENTARY Rule 1(b) (Federal Judicial Center 1986) [hereinafter ILLUSTRATIVE
RULES]; see infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Illustrative Rules);
see also Burbank, supra note 8, at 23; D'Amato, supra note 103, at 618. See generaly
Abrams, supra note 20, at 80-100 (arguing that for purposes of holding federal judges
publicly accountable, misconduct covered by Act is too broad because it includes im-
peachable offenses under U.S. CONST. art. II § 4 which requires Congressional action
under separation of powers doctrine).
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges provides judges with insight about what
kind of behavior may constitute misconduct under the Act. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 5(c) (1992) [hereinafter CODE] (directing judges to
"refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the judge's
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties, exploit the judicial
position, or involve the judge in frequent transactions with lawyers or other persons likely
to come before. the court on which the judge serves").
Judges tend to be disciplined only for willful violations under the Code and such
willful violations arguably constitute misconduct under the Act. See generally WHEELER &
LEVIN, supra note 29, at 63 (discussing "willful misconduct in office" or "habitual intem-
perance" as common behavioral standards for judges).
109 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1)-(4).
110 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c)(11)(B)-(C). This section also authorizes the Judicial Confer-
ence to prescribe rules or to modify any council's rules. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 8. at 84-85.
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operational rules to implement its provisions."' All councils re-
vised their rules when the Act became effective." Some early
criticism focused on rules that lacked uniformity among the cir-
cuits. In response, a special committee of the Conference of Chief
Judges of the United States Courts of Appeals,. working with the
Federal Judicial Center, prepared Illustrative Rules Governing Com-
plaints of Judicial Misconduct and Disability with Commentay in
1986.1" Although the Illustrative Rules are strictly advisory and do
not fill all the gaps in the Act, most circuits followed the Judicial
Conference's recommendation to adopt them on an experimental
basis."4 They were amended in 1991 to conform to the Act's
1990 amendments." 5 As a result, there is considerable uniformity
among circuit council rules, which, according to the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal (NCJDR), "seri-
ously and sensitively implement the Act.""6
The Act permits "any person" to file with the clerk of the
court of appeals for a circuit a complaint alleging that "a circuit,
district, or bankruptcy judge, or a magistrate, has engaged in con-
duct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of
the business of the courts.""7 Any person can also allege that a
judge or magistrate is "unable to discharge all the duties of office
by reason of mental or physical disability.""' "Any person" in-
cludes the chief judge of the court of appeals."9 Unlike all other
complainants, however, the chief judge need not file a written
complaint with the clerk of the court. 20
When the clerk receives a complaint, it must be promptly
transmitted to the chief judge, unless it concerns the chief judge,
in which case the complaint is transmitted to the active judge who
111 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11).
112 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 85.
113 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 108; see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 85;
see also TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 103-12 (containing some illustrative
rules concerning the confidentiality of complaints). The Special Committee was chaired
by Chief Judge James R. Browning (9th Cir.) and included Chief Judge Emeritus Collins
J. Seitz (3d Cir.) and Chief Judge Charles Clark (5th Cir.). Anthony Partridge of the
Federal Judicial Center was the Committee's Reporter. ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note
108, at i.
114 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 85.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 28 U.S.C. § 372(C)(1).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
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is next in seniority."' The clerk also transmits a copy of the
complaint to the judge who stands accused.'2
The Act vests wide discretion in each chief judge, at least
until the chief judge appoints an investigative committee." After
an expeditious review, 24 the chief judge may dismiss the com-
plaint if (1) it fails to state facts showing misconduct prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts; (2) it relates directly to the merits of a case; or (3) it is
frivolous." Furthermore, the chief judge may "conclude the pro-
ceeding if [the chief judge] finds that appropriate corrective ac-
tion has been taken 1 6 or that ... intervening events" make ad-
ditional action unnecessary.Y2
During the chief judge's review, only the chief judge, the
121 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(2).
122 Id.
123 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c)(3)(A)(i)-(iii) & 372(c)(1)(B); see COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 8, at 84-86.
124 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3) (requiring the chief judge to "expeditiously review[] a com-
plaint"). Apparently "some doubt exists about the power of a chief judge to conduct a
limited inquiry into the factual support for a complainant's allegations" prior to disposing
of the complaint. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 102. The NCJDR recommends
that the 1980 Act be amended to provide for such a "limited inquiry" and the chief
judge "not make findings of fact about any matter that is reasonably in dispute." Id. A
better approach suggested by some commentators requires the chief judge or the chief
judge's staff to examine the record in the underlying case to determine whether the
facts are plainly untrue or incapable of being investigated. See Barr & Willging, supra
note 7, at 34-39; see also ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 108, Rule 4(b) (authorizing the
chief judge to "conduct a limited inquiry for the purpose of determining" veracity or
verifiability of facts in the complaint, "whether appropriate corrective action has been or
can be taken without the necessity for a formal investigation, and whether the facts stat-
ed in the complaint are either plainly untrue or incapable of being established through
investigation").
125 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3) (A) (i)-(iii); see 1992 DIRECrOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANNUAL REPORT 89.
126 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (3) (B). One example of a chief judge dismissing a complaint
because corrective action was taken involved a prison inmate who complained that a
district judge had unreasonably delayed in deciding motions in a case that would harm
the recollection of witnesses. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 90. Pursuant to
the chief judge's request for a response, the trial judge responded that his clerk had
accidently marked the case closed and that he would order the case reopened and
promptly decide all pending matters. Id.
127 The 1990 amendments to the Act added the "intervening events" provision to
reflect the practice of dismissing complaints as "moot" when a judge has resigned, died,
retired, or, in the case of bankruptcy judges or magistrates, was not reappointed. See Barr
& Willging, supra note 7. at 78-79. "The only interesting matter" to arise under the ru-
bric of mootness or intervening events concerned whether articles of impeachment
against a judge rendered a complaint moot. Id. at 78. The special investigative committee
considering this matter declined to act on the complaint.
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complainant, the clerk of the court, and the accused judge are
supposed to be aware of the complaint." If the chief judge dis-
misses or concludes the proceedings, the chief judge must state in
writing the reasons for the action and transmit copies of the order
to the complainant and to the accused judge or magistrate.' 29 If
the chief judge does not dismiss or conclude the proceedings, "a
special committee to investigate the facts and allegations contained
in the complaint" must be appointed, composed of district and
appellate court judges from the same circuit.s The chief judge
must certify the complaint and any other documents necessary for
the special investigative committee and also must notify the com-
plainant and the accused judge."' The Act grants the special
committee full subpoena powers and authorizes it to investigate all
the facts and allegations contained in the complaint.1 2 After
conducting "an investigation as extensive as it considers necessary,"
the committee must "expeditiously file a comprehensive report"
about the investigation with "the judicial council of the cir-
cuit."33 The report outlines the committee's findings and its rec-
ommendations for "necessary and appropriate action by the judi-
cial council of the circuit." " The Act does not require that ei-
ther the complainant or the accused receive a copy of the
report.3
5
Upon receipt of the special committee's report, the judicial
128 As a practical matter, persons other than. this small group often know about the
complaint. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing complainants' free-
dom to ignore the Act's confidentiality provisions and publicize their complaints, often to
the consternation of aggrieved judges who feel less free to respond publicly); see also Doe
v. Judicial Qualification Comm'n, 748 F. Supp. 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (complainant has
First Amendment right to publicize his testimony about judge); Baugh v. Judicial Inquiry
and Review Comm'n, 907 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1990) (First Amendment permits individuals
to publicly report their testimony about judicial misconduct); Barr & Willging, supra note
7, at 179 (a chief judge reporting that "if there's a serious allegation [of misconduct],
the reality is that confidentiality is unlikely.").
129 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(B).
130 Id. § 372(c)(4)(A).
131 Id. § 372(c)(4)(B),(C).
132 Id. § 372(c) (4) (A), (9) (A). The Act also grants subpoena power to the judicial
council, the Judicial Conference, and any standing committee appointed by the Chief Jus-
tice under 28 U.S.C. § 332(d). 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(9) (A), (B); see Williams v. Mercer, 783
F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986) (challenges to subpoena issued by court of appeals must be
to that court and not the district court).
133 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(5).
134 Id.
135 Id. But see infra note 154 and accompanying text (noting that while release is not
required, the judicial council has the discretion to release the report).
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council may institute any of several types of actions to "assure the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts.""s8 The council may conduct further investigation,13 7 dis-
miss the complaint," certify the disability of the judge, 9 re-
quest the judge's voluntary retirement,14 order a temporary halt
in the assignment of cases to the judge,' issue a private or pub-
lic censure or reprimand," and mandate "such other action
as ... [the council] considers appropriate," except for the remov-
al of an Article III judge from office." The judicial council may
also direct the chief judge to take any "appropriate" action, includ-
ing removal, against a magistrate whose conduct is the subject of a
complaint.'" Whatever action the council chooses, it must "im-
mediately provide written notice to the complainant and to.
[the accused] judge or magistrate.""
If grounds for impeachment exist, the judicial council may
recommend impeachment of an Article III judge to the Judicial
Conference." The judicial council is also authorized to certify a
matter for resolution by the Judicial Conference if, in the "interest
of justice," the council is unable to resolve the matter itself.147
With or without referral by the judicial council, the Judicial Con-
ference by a majority vote can recommend impeachment to the
House of Representatives.
136 28 U.S.C. § 372 (c) (6) (B).
137 Id. § 372(c)(6)(A).
138 Id. § 372(c)(6)(C).
139 Id. § 372(c)(6)(B)(ii).
140 Id. § 372(c)(6)(B)(iii).
141 Id. § 372(c) (6) (B) (iv). This provision requires that the interruption of case assign-
ments to a judge be for a "time certain" and not for an unlimited or open period.
Some commentators contend that a long or unlimited suspension in case assignments is
tantamount to removal. See McCalla, supra note 35, at 1289-90. Such de facto removal of
Article M judges contravenes the Article II, § 4 prohibition on the removal of judges
except by impeachment.
142 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (6) (B) (v), (vi).
143 Id. § 372(c) (6) (B) (vii). See generaly supra text accompanying notes 20-39 (discuss-
ing impeachment generally and arguments favoring impeachment as the sole method for
removing Article I judges).
144 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (6) (B) (i). Magistrates are not considered judges for purposes of
Article I of the Constitution and, therefore, are subject to removal by methods other
than impeachment under Article II. See id. § 372(c) (6) (B) (vii) (prescribing that removal
of magistrates be according to 28 U.S.C. § 631 and bankruptcy judges according to 28
U.S.C. § 152); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 89.
145 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(D).
146 Id. § 372(c)(7)(B)(i).
147 Id. § 372(c)(7)(B)(ii).
148 Id. § 372(c) (8) (B). The Judicial Conference by a majority vote can recommend to
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The Act prohibits the filing of amicus curiae briefs or third-
party interventions of any kind in disciplinary proceedings before
the judicial council or the Judicial Conference." Although the
prohibition expressly applies to matters before the judicial council
and the Judicial Conference, there is little reason to believe that it
is limited only to these proceedings; it probably also applies to
review by the chief judge or the investigative committee." °
Intervention and amicus curiae participation may occur more
commonly in formal adjudicative proceedings, such as those be-
fore the judicial council or the conference. Yet it is conceivable
that a third party might wish to intervene or file an amicus curiae
brief while a complaint proceeding is still in its infancy-under
investigation by the chief judge and before the appointment of a
special investigative committee. After all, for an accused judge, the
optimal time for supportive third-party intervention is probably at
this early stage in the proceedings while the chief judge can still
take unilateral and relatively discreet action in dismissing the com-
plaint.'"
Section 372(c) (14) of the Act establishes a general rule of
confidentiality: "All papers, documents, and records of proceedings
related to investigations conducted under this subsection shall be
confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person in any pro-
ceeding .... 152 Although this section by its terms applies only
the House of Representatives the impeachment of a judge or magistrate convicted of a
felony, providing the felon-judge "has exhausted all means of obtaining direct review of
the conviction, or the time for seeking further direct review of the conviction has passed
and no such review has been sought." Id. In other words, the Judicial Conference does
not have to wait for a referral from the judicial council recommending impeachment
pursuant to § 372(7) (B) (i); the Conference can act unilaterally in the case of a judge
convicted of a felony.
149 Id. § 372(c)(13).
150 Congress' failure to extend the prohibition clearly to other stages of the Act may
permit chief judges to allow third-party participation either before or during the special
investigative committee stage of the Act See id. § 372 (c)(13).
151 For example, the chief judge may order a dismissal of a frivolous complaint or
conclude the complaint proceedings if "appropriate corrective action" has already oc-
curred or if "intervening events" make further disciplinary action unnecessary. See supra
text accompanying notes 125-127.
152 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14); see Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 36; see also Edwards,
supra note 16, at 789 (Act requires judiciary to follow intricate procedures including
"nearly absolute confidentiality" (citing 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14))); TWENTIETH CENTURY
REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 ("[Mlost details of current disciplinary procedures are confi-
dential. Thus, the public, public interest groups, and scholars are at a disadvantage in
evaluating these procedures. As a result, there is no comprehensive record of the deci-
sions of the chief judges and the judicial councils in response to the 1980 reforms.");
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 103 (The Act's confidentiality provision leaves
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to special committee investigations, "most chief judges have inter-
preted it to apply to all stages of the process, including chief
judge review of complaints."15 Yet the Act also clearly establishes
four exceptions to the general rule of blanket confidentiality. The
first is discretionary; the judicial council of the circuit may release
a copy of the report of a special investigative committee to the
complainant and the judge who is the target of the impeachment
investigation."
The second exception directs the judicial council or the Judi-
cial Conference, or the Senate or the House of Representatives by
resolution, to release any material it considers necessary to an
impeachment investigation or trial under Article I of the Constitu-
tion.'55 Unlike the first exception, this exception is not expressly
"open the question whether and to what degree confidentiality should be required if a
special committee is not appointed. [Nevertheless, t]he Illustrative Rules extend confiden-
tiality to earlier points in the process.").
153 Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 36; see also TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra
note 2, at 106 (Although "the reference to 'investigation' suggests that section 372(c)(14)
technically applies only in cases in which a special committee has been appointed[,] . . .
[Illustrative Rule 16] applies the rule of confidentiality more broadly, covering consider-
ation of a complaint at any stage."). Illustrative Rule 16, which addresses confidentiality,
provides:
(a) General Rule. Consideration of a complaint by the chief judge, a special
committee, or the judicial council will be treated as confidential business, and
information about such consideration will not be disclosed by any judge, magis-
trate, or employee of the judicial branch or any person who records or tran-
scribes testimony except in accordance with these rules.
(b) Files. All files related to complaints of misconduct or disability .. , will be
maintained separate and apart from all other files and records, with appropriate
security precautions to ensure confidentiality.
ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 108, at 49. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8,
at 104-10 (reporting "uncertainty and controversy have surrounded the issue of confidenti-
ality under the Act", id. at 106, and noting that the Illustrative Rules which support a
broader interpretation of § 372(c)(14) have generally achieved "an appropriate balance",
id. at 107, between the conflicting policies of confidentiality and public accountability).
154 Section 372(c) (14) (A) of the Act provides:
[Tihe judicial council of the circuit in its discretion [may] release[] a copy of a
report of a special investigative committee . . . to the complainant whose com-
plaint initiated the investigation by that special committee and to the judge or
magistrate whose conduct is the subject of the complaint .. ..
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14)(A).
155 Section 372(c)(14)(B) of the Act authorizes that all information
related to investigations . ., shall be confidential . . . except to the extent
that-the judicial council of the circuit, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, or the Senate or the House of Representatives by resolution, releases any
such material which is believed necessary to an impeachment investigation or
trial of a judge under article I of the Constitution . . . .
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made discretionary. Yet the body considering whether to release
information has discretion in deciding whether the information is
necessary to the investigation. Thus, the decision about the release
is at least in some measure discretionary.
Third, disclosure to the public will occur at the request of the
judge or magistrate who is the subject of the investigation and
with the concurrence of the chief judge, the Chief Justice, or the
chair of the Judicial Conference's standing committee established
to review such matters.156 Again, disclosure is not certain to oc-
cur because it requires the written permission of the accused
judge or magistrate and of another party, such as the chief judge.
Fourth, the Act permits disclosure of disciplinary proceedings
when a majority of the Judicial Conference votes to recommend
that the House of Representatives consider impeachment or other
"necessary" action against a judge.57 Disclosure of the record of
the proceedings of the judicial council or of the Judicial Confer-
ence is discretionary in the sense that it depends upon a finding
that impeachment may be warranted. Thus, the Act expressly
makes two of its four exceptions to confidentiality discretionary
and the other two become applicable only after a determination
that impeachment may be warranted.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14)(B).
156 Section 372(c)(14)(C) of the Act permits
such disclosure [when it) is authorized in writing by the judge or magistrate
who is the subject of the complaint and by the chief judge of the circuit, the
Chief Justice, or the chairman of the standing committee [created pursuant to
section 331 of title 28 which establishes the Judicial Conference] ....
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14)(C).
157 Id. § 372(c) (8) (A). In addressing a recommendation of impeachment by the Ju-
dicial Conference, this section states, in part: "Upon receipt of the determination and
record of proceedings in the House of Representatives, the Clerk of the House of Repre-
sentatives shall make available to the public the determination and any reasons for the
determination." Unlike subsection (A), subsection 372(c)(8)(B) does not expressly call for
similar disclosure. It provides for a recommendation of impeachment by a majority vote
of the Judicial Conference when a judge or magistrate has been convicted of a felony
and has exhausted all means of obtaining direct review of the conviction or the time for
seeking such review has passed or the party has no intention of seeking review. Id. §
372(c)(8)(B). Presumably the Clerk of the House, as in subsection (A), can also "make
available to the public the determination [by the Judicial Conference] and any reasons
for the determination," especially since a felony conviction is a matter of public record.
Id. § 372(c)(8)(A).
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IIn. THE JUDICIARY AND CONFIDENTIALIY
A. The Act's Confidentiality Provisions
Three provisions of the Act work together to "mandate[]
confidentiality with respect to most proceedings.""5 The first pro-
vision, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (3), vests in the chief judge of the cir-
cuit broad discretion to "dismiss a complaint" for inadequacy.'5 9
A complaint is inadequate if it is not in conformity with the Act,
is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling,
or is frivolous.t The chief judge can also "conclude the pro-
ceeding if... appropriate corrective action has been taken
or... action on the complaint is no longer necessary because of
intervening events."" ' An intervening event could be the with-
158 Edwards, supra note 16, at 793. Subsequent to Judge Edwards' description, the Act
was amended in 1990. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 402, 104 Stat. 5122 (1990). However,
the amendments did not change the accuracy of Judge Edwards' description about the
Act's broad mandate for confidentiality.
The 1990 Amendments instituted two changes worth noting. First, if the Judicial
Conference concurs with a determination of the council or makes its own determination
that impeachment proceedings are warranted, "the Clerk of the House of Representatives
shall make available to the public the determination and any reasons for the determina-
tion." 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c) (8) (A), (14) (Supp. V. 1993). Second, the judicial council now
has discretion to "release[] a copy of a report of a special investigative committee . . . to
the complainant whose complaint initiated the investigation by that special committee
and to the judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject of the complaint ... " Id.
§ 372(c) (14) (A).
159 Id. § 372(c)(3)(A).
160 Id. § 372(c)(3) (A) (ii),(iii); see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 84. In discuss-
ing some of the Act's problems, NCJDR reported that some chief judges took an unduly
broad view of when a complaint is related to the "merits of a decision or procedural rul-
ing." Id. at 93. A Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study cited a source of confusion re-
garding the "merit-relatedness standard [for dismissal] is the interplay between a 'direct
relationship' to the merits and the availability of an appellate remedy." Id. at 92. The
Commission Report cited several arguably meritorious complaints described by the IJC au-
thors that were dismissed on merit-relatedness because "'some appellate remedy did, or
might exist,' arguing that 'some inquiry by the chief judge into the factual support for
the complaint might have been more appropriate.'" Id. at 92-93. Examples of premature
dismissal included one pro se litigant's complaint that six specific docket entries in his
case were falsified and two other complaints of alleged improper ex parte communica-
tions. Id. at 93. These examples evince an overly technical or narrow construction byjudges of the Act's avowed purpose of public accountability and, at worse, a general
reluctance to engage in self-discipline. In any event, these decisions are not likely to
inspire the public's trust in judicial self-regulation.
161 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (3) (B). In the 1990 amendment to the Act, chief judges were
granted the additional authority to dismiss complaints if "intervening events" make fur-
ther action unnecessary. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 84; see also supra note
127 and accompanying text.
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drawal of a judge or magistrate from a case because of an alleged
conflict of interest or due to resignation or retirement."
The chief judge's decision to dismiss or conclude the com-
plaint proceedings must be in writing. 63 Until recently, these
written orders were unavailable to the public or, if available, so
brief as to provide the public with little meaningful information
about the alleged misconduct. Indeed, the published order might
omit the names of the complainant and the accused judge, con-
taining only the cryptic message that the complaint had been
dismissed, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, or
that the process had been -concluded due to intervening
events.' 64 This prompted the NCJDR to recommend that Con-
gress amend the Act to make Illustrative Rule 17 mandatory in all
circuits if it was not adopted as uniform policy by the courts."
Rule 17 requires the public availability of a chief judge's or ju-
dicial council's order dismissing a complaint that is no longer
subject to review."6 The Rule also states that a chief judge's or-
der concluding a complaint proceeding shall be publicly avail-
able." Supporting memoranda outlining the reasons for such
orders, as well as any dissenting opinions or separate statements by
162 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (3) (B); see supra note 127.
163 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (3).
164 Jud. Conf. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders, Re-
port to the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 23-24 (Mar. 1994) (noting that boiler-plate
dismissal orders are "not uncommon") (on file with the FJC); ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra
note 108, Rule 17 commentary at 54-55 ("With regard to dispositions by the chief judge,
the more general practice is apparently not to permit public access" to the order of
disposition and the name of the judge or magistrate.).
165 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 106, 153 (indicating that "most [judicial]
councils have adopted [Illustrative Rule 17] and report no difficulties under it" and rec-
ommending that all councils or the Judicial Conference adopt Rule 17 within a reason-
able period of time otherwise Congress should amend the Act to impose Rule 17). Rule
17 provides, in part:
A docket-sheet record of orders of the chief judge and the judicial council and
the texts of any memoranda supporting such orders and any dissenting opinions
or separate statements by members of the judicial council will be made public
when final action on the complaint has been taken and is no longer subject to
review.
ILLuSTrATIE RULES, supra note 108, at 52.
166 Id. at 52-53.
167 Id. Rule 17 provides that when a chief judge's order dismisses a complaint or
concludes a proceeding which is no longer subject to review, then such order and any
supporting memoranda should be made public. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at
106; see also supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text (providing a background discus-
sion of the Illustrative Rules).
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council members, shall also be publicly available." However, the
Rule provides that these orders and memoranda will exclude the
name of the complainant and the accused judge."
Although many circuit councils had already adopted Illustra-
tive Rule 17, the Judicial Conference recently adopted it as uni-
form policy in all circuits.1 7 While Rule 17 compliance enhances
accountability in most circuits, 7' especially for chief judges, the
judiciary still retains virtually complete discretion concerning what
and how much information to provide in support of orders dis-
missing a complaint or concluding proceedings.
The second provision of the Act that insulates disciplinary
proceedings from public disclosure is 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(13). This
section expressly prohibits both third-party intervention and ami-
cus curiae participation in proceedings before the judicial council
or the Judicial Conference, and probably at all stages of the
Act.Lr This limits the number of parties involved in the judicial
complaint process to the complainant and the accused judge.
Section 372(c)(13)'s broad prohibition may hinder the ability of
the accused judge and the complainant to present their strongest
cases by enlisting the assistance of third parties. It also effectively
denies the judicial council, the Conference, and arguably, the
168 ILLuSTRATvE RuLES, supra note 108, Rule 17 and commentary at 52, 54.
169 Id. at 55. The Act expressly requires confidentiality only with the appointment of
a special committee. The drafters of the Illustrative Rules started off with the "dubious
assumption that '[t]he [Act] and its legislative history exhibit a strong policy goal of
protecting judges and magistrates from the damage that could be done by publicizing
unfounded allegations of misconduct.'" Marcus, supra note 15, at 425.
170 See L Ralph Mecham, Director, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts, Memorandum to
All Judges [and other Staff], Preliminary Report of Actions Taken by the Judicial Confer-
ence of the U.S., in session, Mar. 15, 1994, at 10 (Mar. 23, 1994) (on file at the FJC)
(endorsing, "in principle, the recommendations of the [NCJDR] a) that Illustrative Rule
17(a), providing for the public availability of sanitized chief judges' orders dismissing or
concluding complaints, be uniformly adopted and adhered to by all circuits and courts
covered by the Act; b) that the provisions of the Illustrative Rules regarding confidentiali-
ty be adopted and adhered to by all circuits and courts covered by the Act; c) that chief
judges' orders dismissing or concluding complaints set forth the allegations of the com-
plaint and the reasons for the disposition as required by Illustrative Rule 4(f); . . .");
see also Interview, Judge Levin H. Campbell: Preserving a Fair System of Judicial Conduct, 26,
No. 6 THE THIRD BRANCH, June, 1994 at 10 (as chair of the Jud. Conf. Comm. to Re-
view Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders, reporting that the Jud. Conf. adopt-
ed the NCJDR's recommendation that all circuits should adopt Rule 17(a)-publicizing
sanitized dismissal orders of chief judges).
171 See infra note 318 and accompanying text (contending that Rule 17 represents a
retreat from the level of accountability in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit).
172 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(13); see supra text accompanying notes 149-51.
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chief judges, the benefits of such assistance.
The third and most important provision,"7 § 37 2(c) (14), ex-
pressly mandates confidentiality for special committee investiga-
tions except in four situations. 4 It prohibits "any person in any
proceeding" from disclosing any "papers, documents, and records
of proceedings related to investigations."17  However, §
372(c) (14) has been broadly construed by the judiciary as implic-
itly mandating total confidentiality for the complaint process sub-
ject to the Act's four exceptions.1 76
B. Justifications for Confidential Self-Discipline
Traditional arguments in favor of confidentiality focus primari-
ly on two different, but related, values: judicial independence and
efficiency.1 7   The argument based upon judicial independence
reflects the belief that an independent judiciary is necessary to
provide a check on the other two branches of government and to
ensure the impartial administration of justice. Protecting the priva-
cy and reputation of individual judges is considered a prerequisite
to preserving the independence and integrity of the entire judicial
system.178 Proponents of secrecy also focus on the notion of effi-
ciency, arguing that a more open discipline process will inevitably
be more complex and expensive.
1 79
173 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
174 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14)(A)-(C). See generally supra notes 154-57 and accompanying
text (discussing four exceptions to § 372(c)(14)'s broad confidentiality rule).
175 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14).
176 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
177 For an excellent and critical discussion of the arguments typically advanced in
favor of confidentiality, see SHAMAN r AL., supra note 17, at 416-38; Shaman & B~gu6,
supra note 17, at 760-66; see also CAPPELLETrI, supra note 12, at 84 (an international com-
parative study of judges and judicial disciplinary systems); Marcus, supra note 15, at 424-
32 (identifying various confidentiality interests under the Act).
178 See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 985 (5th Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (dissentihg opinion) (commenting on a judge's role in a conspiracy to violate the
1871 Civil Rights Act, the court noted that "[i]f there is anything a judge ought to prize
and that the public demands, it is his judicial integrity . . . . [A] judge must not only
avoid evil but he must also avoid even the appearance of it."), afftd, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
See generally In re Lauer, 788 F.2d 135, 138 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Although federal judges en-
joy the independence accorded them under the Constitution, every judge should at the
same time be keenly aware that the independence of the federal judicial branch de-
pend[s] in large part on public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judi-
ciary." (quoting Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952)
("[J]udges [must establish a] habit of self-discipline and self-criticism .. "))).
179 See PROPOSED MODEL Rut.ES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIpLrNARY ENFORCEMENT, Preamble
(1994) [hereinafter ABA PROPOSED JuDICIAL ENFORCEMENT] (Although expressly not appli-
cable to federal judges, the preamble emphasizes that both judges and the public share
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1. Judicial Independence
Voluminous literature and legions of speakers have stressed
the importance of an independent and impartial judiciary."s Pro-
ponents of the Act's confidentiality provisions begin by arguing
that the vast majority of complaints against judges are not merito-
rious. One recent study, which supports this contention, iridicated
that chief judges dismissed ninety-five percent of the complaints
filed and not withdrawn through 1991 on the basis that they were
frivolous, directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural
ruling, or not in conformity with the Act.181
Proponents of confidentiality then argue that nonmeritorious
complaints pose a serious threat to the privacy and reputations of
individual judges.' Complaints are said to attract front-page cov-
erage while their retractions often receive little attention.1as One
an important interest in having judicial disciplinary complaints "resolved promptly and
accurately."); see also infra text accompanying notes 211-16 (discussing typical transaction
costs or concerns associated with a more open disciplinary process); Marcus, supra note
15, at 391-401 (assessing costs of Act).
180 See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of limits on the
principle, see Owen M. Fiss, The Limits ofJudicial Indepemene, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L
REV. 57, 57-62 (1993) (questioning whether the Act is the appropriate method for deal-
ing with judicial misconduct).
181 See Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Administration of the Federal Judicial Con-
duct and Disability Act of 1980, in I RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 53, at 477-712; see also
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 92. Chief judges dismissed 95% of the complaints
filed and not withdrawn through 1991, vindicating Congress' prediction that most com-
plaints "would and should be dismissed as not in conformity with the Act, frivolous, or
directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling." The NCJDR overcame
the "major barrier" of gaining access both to dismissal orders and complaints. It reported
that the Act's broad "substantive ambiguity"-the "conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts" standard-"is itself a barrier" to
determining whether these dismissals were appropriate. The NCJDR was satisfied, never-
theless, based on the sample of complaints and dismissal orders that it reviewed, that the
Act's substantive ambiguity has not created a serious problem of permitting judges to
improperly dismiss complaints warranting additional investigation. Id.
182 See First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467,
476 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (substantial state interest in preserving limited confiden-
tiality provisions to protect reputation of judges and judiciary as institution from unfound-
ed complaints); Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 797 F. Supp. 1083, 1092-93 (D.
Conn. 1992) (highlighting the need to shield judges from social malcontents and from
personal harassment and personal attacks resulting from their rulings (citing Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) and In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1263 (2d Cir.
1984)); see also Shaman & B1gu6, supra note 17, at 764-66; Judicial Misconduct, supra note
12, at 1086. See generally ABA PROPOSED JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 179, Rule 11
commentary ("[C]onfidentiality is necessary to protect a judge's reputation from un-
founded charges ....").
183 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1970) (noting that "it is
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chief judge stated that "'the threat of newspaper coverage is a big
deterrent. Every judge worries about something coming out in the
newspaper. ' "' Another circuit council executive reported that
sometimes the press is informed about complaints before the judi-
ciary is and that publicized complaints "'bring[] a lot of unwanted
attention on the courts. ' "" Prominent coverage of complaints
may effectively deny judges an adequate opportunity to protect
their reputations, 8 especially given the judiciary's "strong tradi-
tion" of not responding to complaints.18 7 This tradition and the
the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge. Denials, retractions, and
corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original story.").
184 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 428 (quoting Federal Judicial Center (FJC) Study
interviews with circuit chief judges; owing to the confidential nature of the study, no
identifying information was provided).
185 See id. at 431 (quoting FJC Study); see also David Johnston, Appointment in
Whitewater Turns into a Partisan Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1994, at 1. A poignant and
recent example of widespread press coverage before the filing of a complaint involved
Judge David B. Sentelle who headed a three-judge appellate panel that appointed Ken-
neth W. Starr as the new Whitewater independent prosecutor. Democratic senators
claimed that Judge Sentelle's meeting with Senators Lauch Faircloth and Jesse Helms,
conservative Republicans and presumably supporters of Starr, was improper because the
panel was still considering its choice for prosecutor. Id. at 1, 7. Several "senior Demo-
crats, frustrated that the independent counsel law contains no route for appealing the
panel's choice, discussed seeking a disciplinary review of Judge Sentelle's conduct" under
the Act. Id. at 1.
186 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 106 (noting that at least one circuit
council refused to adopt Illustrative Rule 17's approach to making dismissal orders and
supporting memoranda public out of concern that the media will highlight only the fact
that charges were made and not that they were also dropped); see also Johnston, supra
note 185, at 1 (reporting that some fellow judges "questioned" the propriety of Judge
Sentelle's contact with "a leading critic" of the previous Whitewater prosecutor while con-
sidering his replacement and, although Judge Sentelle denied any impropriety, the re-
ports of possible misconduct arguably overshadowed his denial). For recent examples of
highly publicized nonfrivolous complaints against prominent state judges, see, e.g., Mi-
chael deCourcy Hinds, Pennsylvania House Votes to Impeach a State Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 1994, at A14 (Pennsylvania House of Representatives voted unanimously to impeach
Justice Rolf Larsen charging numerous offenses, including improperly assisting friends and
contributors with their cases before his court and lying under oath); Diana J. Schemo, A
Prison Term of 15 Months for Wachtler, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at BI (Chief Justice Sol
Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals resigned and pled guilty to sexual harass-
ment); Rhode Island Ex-Judge Accused of Felony, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at AS; Top Rhode
Island Justice Quits Amid Accusations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1993, at 11 (Chief Justice Thomas
F. Fay of the Rhode Island Supreme Court resigned from office in face of an impeach-
ment inquiry and was later indicted by a grand jury and convicted on felony charges of
obstructing justice regarding possible misuse of special court fund; second resignation of
Rhode Island justice in recent years); see also William Carlsen, Judicial Panel Agrees to Probe
Top State Judge, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 25, 1993, at Al, 21 (Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas of
the California Supreme Court investigated by state Commission on Judicial Performance
about acceptance of travel expenses from groups with petitions before his court and his
frequent absences from court).
187 See First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 579 F. Supp.
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Act's confidentiality provisions lead many judges to conclude that
they must "'grin and bear'" all "'unfounded but facially credible
allegation[s]'" of misconduct that are "'leak[ed] ... to the
press. ' "ls
Proponents of confidentiality fear that judges will be intimi-
dated by the threat of complaints and will compromise their im-
partiality or independence by currying favor with litigants and
other parties who might seek retribution.' Accordingly, propo-
nents believe that compromises will undermine the integrity of
individual judges as well as of the entire judiciary."9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
discussed the harm that frivolous complaints can produce in In re
Martin-TDigona.19  Mr. Martin-Trigona filed numerous lawsuits
against a variety of parties, including federal and state judges. The
federal district court granted an injunction prohibiting him from
filing an action' in any district court in the circuit without first
seeking court permission. On appeal, Judge Winter wrote that. a
federal court has the power to take whatever "means necessary to
carry out [its] constitutional function" of administering the federal
legal system efficiently."' Unless the court protected its person-
192, 215 (E.D. Pa. 1984), afgd, 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc); see also CHARLES
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 601 (1986) ("judicial tradition leaves judges unable to
defend themselves against groundless public charges" for fear of appearing less than im-
partial or becoming embroiled in public controversy); Marcus, supra note 15, at 433 (a
question exists about the right of judges to publicly respond to complaints; some judges
publicly respond whereas others feel that such responses are prohibited).
188 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 427 n.175 (quoting the FUC Study).
189 See Bryan E. Keyt, Reconciling the Need for Confidentiality in Judicial Disciplinay Pro-
ceedings with the First Amendment: A Justification Based Analysis, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959,
966-70 (1994); see also R. Wheeler & A. Levin, Judicial Discipline and Removal in the
United States 1-2 (July 1979) (unpublished Federal Judicial Center staff paper, on file at
the American Judicature Society) (suggesting that judicial discipline process "should pro-
tect against unwarranted release of unfounded charges and adverse information"). &e
generally Marcus, supra note 15, at 394 (Although the Act has not threatened judicial in-
dependence, "[a]ll are agreed that . . . in the abstract, judicial discipline could pose a
risk to (judicial] independence.").
190 See Fiss, supra note 180, at 58-9; see also Edwards, supra note 16, at 772 ("But if a
judge can be made to answer outside of the criminal and impeachment processes for
judicially related activities, pursuant to a loosely constructed congressional act regulating
judicial 'misconduct,' one wonders about the sanctity of separation of powers and the
inviolability of judicial independence.").
191 In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1263 (2d Cir. 1984).
192 Id. at 1262. Later, the injunction would be broadened to prohibit the plaintiff
from filing any suit in any federal court without first seeking leave from the court. See
also Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1386-88 (lth Cir. 1993) (discussing the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeal's application of the Second Circuit's injunction against
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nel and their families from frivolous attacks like Mr. Martin-
Trigona's, the courts would find it increasingly difficult to recruit
talented people "for all positions in the judicial branch."19
Judicial independence is, of course, of critical importance to
the proper functioning of the judiciary. Yet courts have not always
concluded that it must prevail over openness. In Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia,"M the Supreme Court assumed, with-
out deciding, that judicial independence and the protection of
judges' privacy and reputations were valid and important state
interests. In Landmark Communications, a Virginia state statute pro-
hibited the publication of information concerning complaint pro-
ceedings before the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commis-
sion.95 A newspaper challenged the statute, and the state argued
that the public's interest was not served by the disclosure of frivo-
lous or nonmeritorious complaints. The Court rejected the state's
argument, noting that the public discussion of governmental af-
fairs is one of the basic principles protected by the First Amend-
ment and that publication by the press and the open discussion of
judicial processes work to prevent miscarriages of justice and abus-
es of power.196 Complaints of judicial misconduct provide the
public with an important opportunity to consider the effectiveness
of its courts.
There are other reasons, consistent with the Court's ruling in
Landmark Communications, for preferring full disclosure of judicial
complaints over the Act's current regime of secrecy. First, using
judicial independence to justify shielding an important part of the
disciplinary process from public scrutiny carries overtones of "pro-
fessional paternalism." 9 ' It assumes that the public is unable or
unwilling to consider responsibly allegations in a complaint.'98 At
Martin-Trigona).
193 In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1261-62; see also Nolan, supra note 67, at 871
(imposing "unnecessary but burdensome or intrusive regulations . . . [has the] potential
to discourage service in the judiciary.").
194 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); see also Keyt,
supra note 189, at 970-71.
195 Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 830.
196 Id. at 839 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1960)); see Keyt,
supra note 189, at 972.
197 Paternalism is "a policy or practice of treating or governing people in a fatherly
manner, especially by providing for their needs without giving them responsibility." Rob-
ert S. Redmount, Paternalism and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 127, 127
(1989) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 909 (2d
ed. 1985)); see also id. (examining professional paternalism in traditional lawyer-client rela-
tionships and urging lawyers to be more egalitarian when dealing with clients).
198 Cf. Doe v. Florida Judicial Qualification Comm'n, 748 F. Supp. 1520, 1527 (S.D.
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least one federal court recently rejected this justification for pro-
hibiting a Florida complainant from publicly disclosing the con-
tents of his complaint against a state judge in confidential pro-
ceedings.19 The same court also rejected the state's argument
that the publication of nonmeritorious complaints "would invest
[the complaints] with an undeserved legitimacy in the public
eye." 20
Second, complainants are generally free under the First
Amendment to make public their complaints and other informa-
tion about the accused judge before and even after the filing of a
complaint.21  Several chief judges indicated that the accused
judge is at a disadvantage when a complaint is made public be-
cause judges feel bound to remain silent as a result of judicial
tradition and the Act's confidentiality provisions.2' Thus, the
confidentiality provisions, which are designed in part to protect
judicial morale, may actually harm morale since judges are inhibit-
ed in responding to allegations of misconduct.2° The potential
for judicial demoralization is minimized by the Act and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, both of which guarantee
judges sufficient opportunity to defend their actions. Nevertheless,
a completely open process clearly would free judges to defend
themselves against nonmeritorious complaints, thereby possibly
bolstering morale.2°
Fla. 1990) (public is capable of evaluating the legitimacy of judicial complaints).
199 Doe, 748 F. Supp. at 1527:29.
200 SHAMAN Er AL, supra note 17, at 67-68; see Doe, 748 F. Supp. at 1527-28;" see also
Marcus, supra note 15, at 399 (suggesting that the burden of disposing of "flagrant exam-
ples of abuse of the Act," like the repeated complaints of Mr. Martin-Trigona, is "not too
great").
201 See Doe, 748 F. Supp. at 1529. Bryan Keyt, supra note 189, enumerates the First
Amendment rights available to complainants in this area:
[C]ourts have generally established that several explicit First Amendment rights
exist: (1) Third parties and nonparticipants in the proceedings cannot be pun-
ished. for publishing lawfully acquired, truthful information; (2) A witness cannot
be prevented frn discussing the substance of their testimony (although it is not yet clear
whether a state can temporarily delay disclosure for part of the proceedings), (3) A wit-
ness has a right to disclose the end result of the proceedings; and (4) A com-
plainant has a right to disclose the fact that a complaint has been filed.
Id. at 984-85 (emphasis added).
202 Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 179.
203 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 428. Some circuit chief judges expressed this con-
cem in an FJC Study. Id. at 427 n.175. For example, one judge stated: "'It's harder now
to get good lawyers to come on the bench; a lack of confidentiality would make it
worse . . . . Confidentiality is necessary to protect judges.'" Id.
204 The risk of demoralization is further limited in the case of frivolous complaints
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Third, traditional and public mechanisms designed to pro-
mote judicial accountability, such as appellate review, writs of man-
damus, and impeachment, have not undermined judicial indepen-
dence or prestige. 5 This remains true despite the recent spate
of impeachments and criminal convictions of judges.2 °
Fourth, judges are highly trained professionals who should be
able to execute their responsibilities even in the face of
nonmeritorious complaints.207 Moreover, unlike other public offi-
cials, they have life tenure, which furnishes substantial protection
against attacks on their independence and impartiality. The remov-
al of a judge is an extremely difficult and costly process °.2 ' This
may be, in part, because "some of the constitutional protections of
independence have been reinforced by the evolution of broad
cultural understandings that.., insulate the judiciary from politi-
cal control."2°
Judicial independence is not an absolute value,210 and given
or those that involve the merits of a decision or a procedural ruling since the Act vests
the power of dismissal in the chief judge. Cf. id. at 427 n.175 (quoting at least one cir-
cuit chief judge who felt differently "'If every complaint is in the newspaper every time,
that would undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Chief judges would then have
to spend enormous time refuting frivolous allegations.'").
205 Fiss, supra note 180, at 59 (suggesting that judicial independence is "fully respect-
ed when higher court judges supervise other judges through the ordinary, appellate pro-
cedures").
206 Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 156 (chief judges found that recent criminal
prosecutions and impeachments had no effect on their judicial independence); see also
William K. Slate, II, Analysis and Report Surveys of Knowledge and Satisfaction of Federal Judi-
cial Discipline and Removal Mechanisms and Processes, in II RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 53,
at 959, 998 (noting that 294 of 301 (98%) federal appellate, district, bankruptcy, and
magistrate judges reported that disciplinary proceedings never interfered with their judi-
cial independence).
207 See Shaman & B1gu6, supra note 17, at 765 (in reviewing complaints, judges are
probably not easily influenced in assessing a colleague's conduct since they are accus-
tomed to avoiding ex parte contacts of any nature that might influence their decision-
making).
208 See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional protections
of judicial independence). Most states have procedures for removing judges other than by
impeachment. Letter from Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director of The American
Law Institute, to author (Aug. 30, 1994) (on file with author) ("[Most states] have term
elections or appointments that must be renewed by reelection or reappointment."). Such
procedures provide opportunities for public review of performance and possible censure
by nonrenewal. The absence of these procedures or "'democratic' controls" make the
secrecy in the federal system especially stark. Id.
209 Fiss, supra note 180, at 61 (reporting also that no judge has been removed be-
cause of the nation's strong disagreement with his decision).
210 See id. (noting that "[u]nlimited judicial independence without any political con-
trol may interfere with democratic values. What is needed is a limited measure of [polit-
ical insularity]"-limited independence).
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the Supreme Court's preference in Landmark Communications for
the open discussion of governmental processes, proponents of con-
fidentiality should bear the burden of clearly demonstrating that
judicial independence and an open disciplinary process cannot
coexist. In First Amendment parlance, the. proponents should
show that no less-restrictive alternative to the Act's broad rule of
confidentiality is available.
2. The Notion of Efficiency
Proponents of confidentiality maintain that the Act not only
safeguards judicial independence but also facilitates a more effi-
cient disciplinary process.2 11 They contend' that a confidential
process minimizes costs often associated with more open investiga-
tions and adjudications.1  These costs may include the increased
expense and delay involved in especially detailed investigations to
establish clear evidence of misconduct,218 in additional procedur-
al protections,214 and in adverse publicity resulting from a more
211 See Shaman & Bgu6, supra note 17, at 760, 765; see also COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 8, at 86 (noting that there was general agreement in Congress that judicial
independence necessitated a statutory mechanism for the speedy dismissal of frivolous
complaints). See generally BArLEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
4243 (1994).
Like any organization charged with self-regulation, the federal judiciary faces the
difficult question of how much resources to allocate for self-discipline. There is always the
risk that in its quest for organizational efficiency, the judiciary may neglect the legitimate
needs or rights of the accused judges and their victims-individual citizens directly
harmed by the accused's actions and arguably the public at large. For a somewhat analo-
gous discussion concerning a self-regulatory organization and the tension between organi-
zational efficiency and the due process needs of alleged miscreant members, see John P.
Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection: What's Left After NCAA v. Tarkanian?, 21
ARIZ. ST. UJ. 621 (1989).
212 See Geyh, supra note 8, at 246, 268; see also Gerhardt, supra note 30, at 103 (cau-
tioning that even if judicial self-regulation is constitutionally permissible, cumbersome
procedures might strain limited judicial resources and outweigh any intended benefit);
Edwards, supra note 16, at 791-93 (suggesting that old informal disciplinary measures pro-
tected judicial independence and facilitated the efficient resolution of complaints, albeit
criticized as "'secretive' proceedings"). But see Abrams, supra note 20, at 95 (stating that
"the Act effectively undermines one of its intended purposes, . . .by imposing significant
investigative and administrative responsibilities on the judiciary to process meritless com-
plaints"). See generally CALABRESi & BOBBIT, supra note 4, at 55, 131-34 (discussing process
costs associated with various decisionmaking mechanisms involved in the allocation of
scarce resources).
213 See KUKLN & STEMPEL, supra note 211, at 42. For a somewhat analogous discus-
sion of the reasons for the ever-increasing delays and costs of civil litigation, see general-
ly, Robert Banks, The Need for Reform, 74 JUDICATURE 113, 115 (1990) (Harris poll of 400
litigators reporting that "overdiscovery" is most important cause of litigation cost and
delay).
214 For example, the accused judge might seek the right to cross-examine the corn-
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public and probably more contentious adjudicatory process.215
Because even the initial stages of reviewing a complaint consume
valuable judicial resources, speedy disposition is consistent with the
Act's goals. 16
Perhaps the most compelling efficiency rationale for confiden-
tiality is the belief that miscreant judges are more likely to resign
or retire voluntarily if a veil of secrecy preserves their reputa-
tions217--for many, their most important professional asset
211
Testimony before the NCJDR and interviews with chief judges indi-
cate that a "central feature of the Act" is the opportunity for chief
plainant and others prior to the chief judge's appointment of a special investigative com-
mittee. At some point, the accused might also demand a full blown adjudicatory proceed-
ing according to the Federal Rules of Evidence, seek to exclude tainted evidence
(grounded on the Fourth Amendment), and engage in traditional adversarial tactics, such
as delay. The belief is that once judicial disciplining goes public, the accused judge has
no choice but to fight for exoneration, irrespective of personal and judicial costs. See
KUEN & STEMPEL, supra note 211, at 127 (proponents of alternative dispute resolution
contend lower costs and faster processing time is appropriate tradeoff for fewer proce-
dural safeguards).
215 See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text; see also Tom Montgomery, Note, To-
wards Greater Openness in Judicial Conduct Commission Proceedings: Temporay Confidentiality As
an Alternative to Inviolate Confidentlity-Garner v. Cherberg, 111 Wash.2d 811, 765 P.2d
1284 (1988), 64 WASH. L. REv. 955, 970-71 (1989) (open investigations and fact-finding
hearings can be exploited by the media, citing a California Commission on Judicial Per-
formance proceeding involving then Associate Supreme Court Justice Mosk which turned
into a "media circus"). See generally KUKUN & STEMPFI, supra note 211, at 103-27 (discuss-
ing benefits and detriments of resolving disputes through the adversary system with alter-
native dispute resolution models).
216 A complaint not clearly frivolous on its face nor related to the merits of a deci-
sion or procedural ruling will consume valuable judicial resources. In addition to the
time devoted by the chief circuit judge to reviewing a complaint, he will require the
assistance of others, notably the circuit court clerk and possibly staff in his own cham-
bers. If the matter involves a district or bankruptcy court judge or a magistrate, the chief
district court judge may also be consulted. They may assist the chief circuit judge in
investigating, marshalling, and assessing evidence of conduct "prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts." 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1).
217 See Shaman & B1g6, supra note 17, at 765 ("[Violuntary retirement may be an
efficient and economical alternative to formal proceedings . . . ."); WILLiAM BRArrHWArTE,
WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? 89, 94 (1971); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 6, 113; see
also Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 797 F. Supp. 1083, 1093 (D. Conn. 1992)
(emphasizing that miscreant judges would "prefer to end [their] career[s] with dignity"
by resigning from the bench if they could leave "quietly"). See generally COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 124 ("[P]erhaps the greatest benefit of the 1980 Act has been the
support . .. and the impetus it has given, to informal approaches to problems of federal
judicial misconduct and disability."). These considerations convinced the NCJDR that an
alternative disciplinary scheme, like one of the state's, "is neither necessary nor desirable."
Id. at 124.
218 See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 833 (1978); see also
Judicial Misconduct, supra note 12, at 1081; Montgomery, supra note 215, at 968-69.
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judges to intervene early in the complaint process and expeditious-
ly conclude the proceedings on the basis of corrective action.
Individual judges are aware that their fellow judges will evaluate
their actions and decide whether they have engaged in "conduct
prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts."2 ° They are probably also aware that
chief judges dismiss most complaints22l or conclude most pro-
ceedings; the disposition order does not identify the accused judge
in either situation.' Indeed, chief judges are specifically cau-
tioned to protect the anonymity of the judge and the complain-
ant.2
It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1988 one circuit execu-
tive for the Seventh Circuit reported that "[o]ver the last several
years, there have been at least nine federal judicial officers who
retired after a judicial misconduct complaint was looming in the
background. In most of those cases, resolution would have been
unlikely if the statutory judicial misconduct complaint procedure
and remedies were not available." 4 Two recent studies 6f for-
219 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 89-90; see supra text accompanying note 80;
Marcus, supra note 15, at 428 (public disclosure may prevent the chief judge from using
a complaint as a justification for inquiry into the operation of a court or for counseling
an accused towards corrective action); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 90.
Seventy-three complaints or approximately three percent of all complaints filed under the
Act through 1991 were resolved on the basis of corrective action, precluding the need
for appointing a special investigative committee. Also, at least two complaints were dis-
missed by judicial councils on the basis that corrective action was taken. Id. See generally
Barr & WilIging, supra note 7, at 124. The FJC Study reported that 2.5% of dismissals by
chief judges were "problematic." Id. at 92. This generally indicated that additional investi-
gation was warranted before the chief judge dismissed the complaint but not that the
dismissal was ultimately the incorrect decision. Id. at 51-53.
220 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1).
221 See supra note 181 and accompanying text (noting that 95% of complaints were
dismissed by chief judges before 1992). See generally Ceyh, supra note 8, at 277 (informal
and confidential disciplinary action taken by chief judges is common and ari effective
manner of dealing with misconduct).
222 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 106. The Act requires the chief judge to
state his dismissal reasons in writing when the complaint is not in conformity with the
Act, when the complaint is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural
ruling, or when the complaint is frivolous. Despite the Act's requirement, such dismissal
orders have not always provided these reasons. Id. at 84, 86. The failure of some chief
judges to provide detailed, written reasons justifying the dismissal of complaints further
obfuscates for the public the effectiveness of the judiciary's self-regulation.
223 See generally Geyh, supra note 8, at 208 (recommending that informal disciplinary
actions by chief judges be reported to the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, but that care be exercised to keep identities of accused judges confidential).
224 See Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of Federal Judges: The Unreported
Informal Responses, 71 JUDICATURE 282, 283 (1988). For a more detailed report on the
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mer and present chief judges confirm the Seventh Circuit's experi-
ence2Z: between 1981 and 1991 at least twenty-five judges re-
signed or retired while facing formal or informal complaints of
misconduct. 6 The total number is probably greater since some
judges serving fixed terms declined to seek reappointment while
disciplinary charges were pendingY2
The number of resignations or early retirements taken while a
complaint is pending does not suggest that the judiciary is "disre-
garding its responsibilities under the Act."22' Yet this practice
raises several problems, and the efficiency it produces ultimately
fails to justify the Act's secrecy. First, a judge's resignation or re-
tirement does not entail an express admission of official wrong-
doing; indeed, it suggests that the departure is for reasons other
than cause. The public is particularly likely to have this impression
in an environment in which some judges have resigned or retired
to pursue lucrative opportunities in private practice or to seek
other challenging work.2 When considered from the perspective
overall performance of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, see Seventh
Circuit Evaluation, supra note 7.
225 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 384; Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 200-06 (il-
lustrating information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed with the administrative office);
see also Geyh, supra note 8, at 247, 322-23 (eight out of 29 chief judges indicated that
the filing of a § 372(c) complaint caused a judge to resign, retire, or be certified dis-
abled).
226 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 384. See generally Dan M. McGill, Disincentives to Resig-
nation of Disciplined Federal Judges in the Benefits Package of the Federal Judicary, in II RE-
SEARCH PAPERS, supra note 53, at 1221 (suggesting that judges accused or convicted of
misconduct are more likely to retire-if eligible-rather than resign in order to retain
generous job benefits and proposing to neutralize the financial disincentive to resignation
by providing resignees with some benefits, id. at 1239, 1248; disagreeing with the Judicial
Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch which contends that judges' decisions
concerning resignation and early retirement are unlikely to be affected by loss of job
benefits, id. at 1239). See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 114-18.
227 Id. at 385 n.25.
228 Id. at 385.
229 See Glen Elsasser, Rehnquist: Drug Cases Strain Courts, CHIC. TRiB., Jan. 2, 1989, at
C3 (Chief Justice Rhenquist stated that "dozens of federal judges have resigned from the
bench during the past 15 years, far more than ever before, due in large measure to
financial reasons."); Rehnquist Backs Proposal on Pay Hikes for Judges, ST. Louis POST DiS-
PATCH, Jan. 2, 1989, at 10A (citing an American Bar Foundation survey which found that
30% of federal judges who responded said they planned to resign before retirement
unless "'a significant increase in compensation'" was provided). Compare Lee May, Federal
Judges Complain Pay Is Too Low, Seek Raises, LA. TIMES, July 28, 1985, part 1, at 8, which
suggests that judges are public servants and know what they will earn when they take the
job. The article adds that judges "have perquisites, prestige and power that make their
careers satisfying beyond what dollars can buy." Moreover, David Keating, the executive
vice-president of the National Taxpayers Union, stated that judges have a "liberal pension
system, which allows many to draw their full salaries after retiring." Id. See generally
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of the public's interest in information about its governmental offi-
cials,' the Act's veil of secrecy at best obfuscates the real rea-
sons underlying a judge's decision to leave the bench and at worst
conceals judicial, misconduct from the public.
A judge's voluntary resignation or retirement in the face of
allegations of misconduct poses an additional danger. Without a
clear finding of misconduct or some other official acknowledg-
ment of possible misconduct, the public is forced to bear the risk
that a departing judge who engaged in misconduct, but has an
untainted record, may assume another position of public trust
either on the federal or the state level."I This concern, among
others, prompted the drafters of the recent ABA Proposed Model
Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement to grant "continuing
jurisdiction over former judges regarding allegations that miscon-
duct occurred before or during service as a judge." " The
drafters also sought to "ensure that judges [could] not avoid judi-
cial discipline by resigning before information regarding their
conduct is made known." "s Although an accused judge may de-
serve a second chance at public service, the second chance should
be premised on full disclosure of prior allegations of judicial mis-
KRONMAN, supra note 5, at 819 (reporting that although the lawyer-statesman ideal is
jeopardized in the private bar by 'the rise of commercialism, the ideal is not similarly
jeopardized in the judiciary because "judging is not a vehicle for making money").
A'related criticism that recently raised the ire of citizens was the ability of judges
who were convicted of crimes to continue to collect their salaries during the impeach-
ment process. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at i.
230 Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L REV. 405, 407 (1987).
In understanding due process, Judith Resnik suggests that it is important to consider the
public dimension (or its absence) in adjudication and dispute resolution. Id. at 431. She
analyzes the "dominant themes" favoring public participation-that there is an Anglo-
American jurisprudential tradition of public participation, that such participation educates
the public and provides catharsis, and that the public serves as a check on decision mak-
ers and enhances accuracy. Id. at 408. She explains further "the interaction between pro-
cess and the public is important and assists in the development of legal norms about the
merits of disputes, and about how disputes should be handled." Id. For Resnik, the term
"public" "denote[s] a political community, the citizenry of the United States," but in no
way suggests "that this citizenry is a unified group." Indeed, "[t]here are many 'publics.'"
Id. at 407. See generally Robert M. Cover, Volence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 1626-29
(1986). In the context of capital punishment, the article notes that "[i]n the United
States-with only trivial exceptions-no judge sitting alone on a significant legal issue is
immune from appellate review." Id. at 1625.
231 See Van Tassel, supra note 30, at 367 (noting that although the motivations for
the retirement or resignation of federal judges are often serendipitous because no re-
cords are kept, some judges resign or retire to avoid sanctions or public discredit).
232 ABA PROPOSED JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 179, Rule 2B(2).
233 Id.
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conduct and of any evidence uncovered by the judiciary pursuant
to the Act.21
As presently written, the Act does not expressly provide the
judiciary with jurisdiction to discipline a judge who has resigned
or retired in the face of pending complaintsYm Moreover, no
federal court has addressed the propriety of disciplining a judge
or magistrate after withdrawal from office.
The Act's failure to extend disciplinary jurisdiction to cover
former judges and its broad confidentiality provisions create a
powerful tool for chief judges and others to encourage corrupt or
senile judges to resign or retire before the appointment of a spe-
234 One well-known case where the public was willing to permit a miscreant judge to
serve again in a position of public trust involves Alcee Hastings. A special five-judge com-
mittee and investigator John Doar, who had worked in the Civil Rights Division of the
Justice Department in the 1960s, conducted a three and a half year investigation of
Judge Hastings. The committee found "clear and convincing evidence that Judge Hastings
sought to conceal his participation ... with the sale of justice." See Jack Bass, Impeached,
Then Ekcted N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1993, at A21. The Committee also found that Judge
Hastings committed perjury 14 times at the trial where he was acquitted of bribery charg-
es. In 1989, the Senate impeached then Florida Federal District Court Judge Hastings for
various acts of misconduct. In response, he argued that his prosecution was racially moti-
vated. In the fall of 1992, Florida voters elected him to the United States House of Rep-
resentatives. Id. Although controversy still abounds regarding his suitability to serve in the
House of Representatives, the Florida electorate at least knew of his prior misconduct at
the time they elected him.
235 Possible sanctions against a judge who has already left the bench could include:
reprimand, public censure, loss of benefits, and disqualification from ever holding public
office again. See SHAMAN ET AL, supra note 17, at 17.
236 Most of the published decisions concerning claims of judicial misconduct by fed-
eral judges fall into two general categories. The first involves unsuccessful challenges to
the Act's constitutionality based on the separation of powers doctrine. Such challenges
usually involve claims of denial of due process as well. See, e.g., In re Matter of Certain
Complaints, 783 F.2d 1488 (l1th Cir. 1986), afflg Williams v. Mercer, 610 F. Supp. 169
(S.D. Fla. 1985); United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1984). The second
category involves the unsuccessful use of the § 372(c) complaint process to challenge
collaterally the merits of a decision. See, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 691
F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 685 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir.
1982).
State courts are divided on the question of whether authority exists to discipline a
judge who has resigned or retired. See SHAMAN ET AL, supra note 17, at 15-18. Compare In
re Probert, 308 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Mich. 1981) (discipline of former judge warranted in
order to preserve judicial integrity and to prevent the public from construing a failure to
discipline "as an act of condonation" (citing In re Hammond, 585 P.2d 1066 (Kan. 1978)
(public censure of judge who had resigned because of physical disabilities))) with In re
DeLucia, 387 A.2d 362 (NJ. 1978) (resigning judge still subject to discipline, but as
member of the bar, not as a judge). For the most recent decision regarding a court's
jurisdiction to discipline judges who are no longer on the bench, see In re Steady, 641
A.2d 117 (Vt. 1994) (holding that judicial conduct rules did not intend to enable judges
to avoid discipline by resigning).
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cial investigative committee. Aggrieved judges who retire are guar-
anteed their valuable pension benefits, which are subject to forfei-
ture upon impeachment or resignation."' Moreover, judges who
resign or retire at this stage of the process can do so without fear
of additional post-departure disciplinary proceedings under the
Act.' Resignation or retirement is an "intervening event" under
§ 372(c) (3) (B), permitting the chief judge to conclude the com-
plaint proceedings, eliminating the need for further action on the
complaint. 9 While a finding under § 372(c) (3)(B) that "appro-
priate corrective action has been taken" may vaguely suggest some
official condemnation and action against a judge,2 ° the "inter-
vening events" language in that section suggests neither condem-
237 See McGill, supra note 226, at 1225-26 (judicial resignees forfeit all benefits and
prestige of office). Unless independently wealthy, a judge's pension may be his or her
most valuable financial asset. Some judges facing serious charges may retire quietly, fore-
going efforts of vindication, rather than risk forfeiture. See Hazard, supra note 208. See
generally HEARINGS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL
670-74 (1993). Although discussed in the context of a criminal conviction and couched
in terms of resignation rather than retirement, Professor Ronald Rotunda suggested that
a judge who is convicted of a crime might prefer resignation to impeachment because
the miscreant judge retains his pension. Id. at 672. In response to this suggestion, Judge
Levin Campbell of the NCJDR stated that "it would be outrageous for [the convicted
judge] to be paid off by the taxpayers." Professor Rotunda agreed, saying he was also
"troubled [by] find[ing] some way to pay him off so he just resigns." Id. But cf COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 115 (noting one situation where "a corrupt federal
judge avoided impeachment after retiring only by foreswearing retirement benefits").
238 There is a valid concern that subjecting judges to potential discipline after their
departure may cause some judges to engage in long and costly litigation to safeguard the
future of their pensions. See Hazard, supra note 208. Greater openness in the Act and
the long-term preservation of an accused judge's pension, however, are not inextricably
connected. For example, Congress or the judiciary could establish a policy that permitted
judicial resignees to retain some or all of their pension, provided that the resignation
and its underlying reasons are available to the public. The public may conclude that
permitting accused judicial resignees to retain their pensions is an acceptable cost in
return for their voluntary and expeditious removal. However, the public has an important
interest in knowing about the performance of its governmental officials. The public, not
a self-interested judiciary, should decide whether resignees may retain their pensions. See
McGill, supra note 226, at 1248.
239 Section 372 (c)(3)(B) provides: "After expeditiously reviewing a complaint, the
chief judge, by written order stating his reasons, may . . . conclude the proceeding if he
finds that appropriate corrective action has been taken or that action on the complaint
is no longer necessary because of intervening events." Id. (emphasis added).
240 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 412. Although the Act does not define the phrase
"corrective action," it encompasses a variety of events that usually involves "acknowledg-
ment by the judge that there is some problem and/or an undertaking to avoid the prob-
lem in the future." Given the administrative orientation of the Act, Professor Marcus con-
tends that chief judges should enjoy wide discretion in defining corrective action. He
notes that there are problems with the use of this standard. For example, chief judges
frequently treat the dismissal of the complaint itself as corrective action. Id.
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nation nor action. Instead, conclusion of a proceeding due to an
intervening event suggests that the complaint is moot.
A second argument made by proponents of confidentiality is
that it fosters a more efficient disciplinary process because com-
plainants, accused judges, and others will feel free to participate in
the process without fear of unwanted publicity or of retaliation
from judges and others.24 This argument is flawed, however, be-
cause the Act does not expressly require the concealment of the
complainant's identity from the judge who is the subject of the
complaint. 42  Indeed, the Act directs the clerk of the circuit
court to forward the complaint to the chief judge and "to simulta-
neously transmit a copy" to the judge or magistrate who is the
subject of the complaint.243 Additionally, the Illustrative Rules re-
quire that all complaints be signed by the complainant and re-
viewed by the chief judge.2' The chief judge usually talks to the
241 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 428 (noting that potential witnesses may "be more
willing to cooperate if confidentiality could be assured"); see also Shaman & B.gu, supra
note 17, at 760 (On the state level, confidentiality also protects "a commission's sources
of information from subornation of perjury by the accused judges or their colleagues."
(citing Stem v. Morgenthau, 465 N.E.2d 349, 353 (N.Y. 1984) (commission's rule of con-
fidentiality superior to grand jury subpoena power))). But see Vanessa Merton, What
Should We Do About Bad Lauyers?, NEwsDAY, Sept. 25, 1994, at A51 (commenting on the
New York lawyer disciplinary process, Professor Merton stated: "I don't buy the rationale
. . . that secrecy 'promotes voluntary giving of evidence and minimizes outside interfer-
ence'"; New York Bar committee called for a change that would open disciplinary hear-
ings to the public).
242 See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (written complaint must contain a "brief statement of
the facts constituting such conduct"). Any argument that the Act implicitly prohibits the
disclosure of the complainant's identity raises serious questions of fairness for the accused
judge. The inability to readily identify the source of the complaint may hinder the
accused's ability to respond quickly, precisely, and fully to the complainant's allegations.
See also WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 29, at 62 (including as elements of procedural
fairness to the accused judge: notice, the opportunity to confront evidence and argue in-
ferences, and "protection against unwarranted release of unfounded charges and adverse
information"). See generally Baker, supra note 30, at 1133-38 (arguing that the Act denies
the accused judge fair and proper judicial process by merging prosecutorial and adjudica-
tive functions in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
243 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (2).
244 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 108, Rules 2(f), 4(a); see D'Amato, supra note 103,
at 613 ("The insistence that a complainant disclose his identity and assume the risk of
an indictment for perjury seems sharply at variance with . . the Act's purpose of
'promot[ing] and expedit[ing] legitimate complaints against errant judges.'" (citing Harry
T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for Federal Judge, 87
MicH. L. REV. 765, 789 (1989))); see also id. at 611 (two lawyers publicly reprimanded
and fined $500 each for filing disciplinary charges against judge (referring to In re Com-
plaint of Judicial Misconduct, 2 Cl. Ct. 255, 262 (1983))); Geyh, supra note 8, at 258-59
(citing confidentiality as a reason why more complaints are not filed and noting, never-
theless, that chief judges often take informal disciplinary action after notification of an
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aggrieved judge about the complaint informally, and this discus-
sion is bound to involve the disclosure of the complainant's identi-
ty.2"5 Even if the chief judge redacts the complainant's name
from the complaint, the filing date or the nature of the complaint
may reveal the complainant's identity.' Thus, the judge who is
the subject of the complaint and presumably the person most
likely to retaliate against the complainant is one of the first to
learn the complainant's identity.47Another threat to the privacy of the complainant and others
involves the broad investigative authority of the chief judge in the
first instance and, possibly later, of a special investigatory commit-
tee, a judicial council, or the Judicial Conference.24 The com-
plainant has no guarantee under the Act that what may begin as a
unsigned complaint).
245 See Geyh, supra note 8, at 318-19; see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Adverse Publicity
as a Means of Reducing Judicial Decision-Making Delay: Periodic Disclosure of Pending Motions,
Bench Trials and Cases Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L REV. 511, 525-27
(1994) (disclosing that circuit chief judges frequently communicate informally with judges
to resolve misconduct); Seventh Circuit Evaluation, supra note 7, at 702 (revealing that
Chief Judge Bauer called other judges to request issuance of overdue opinions).
246 See Shaman & B~gud, supra note 17, at 760-61 (noting similar problems with con-
fidentiality in the context of state disciplinary processes); SHAMAN ElT AL, supra note 17,
at 418-19 (indicating that the effectiveness of secrecy to protect complainants and wit-
nesses is more theoretical than real and that claims that secrecy fosters complain-
ant/witness participation are exaggerated in state judicial discipline processes); Seventh Cir-
cuit Evaluation, supra note 7, at 718 n.131 (indicating that although the Chicago Council
of Lawyers is willing to act as intermediary to protect lawyers who file complaints, most
lawyers are unwilling to identify the date and times of misconduct due to fear of retalia-
tion).
247 Nevertheless, basic fairness suggests that the accused judge have a fair and early
occasion to respond quickly and fully to any allegation of wrongdoing. Section 372(c)(2)
provides for such prompt notice even if it fails to protect the identity of the complain-
ant.
248 See Illustrative Rule 3(a) (2) (carving out an exception to the Act's general rule of
confidentiality at an early stage of the proceedings). The rule directs the chief judge to
forward a copy of the complaint to the chief district court judge for assistance in resolv-
ing a complaint. But see Marcus, supra note 15, at 429 n.178 (illustrating, with one chief
judge's remarks, that this practice is probably infrequent: "I have never communicated
with a chief judge of a district court about a formal complaint. What are they going to
do about it? It's just another place for a leak.").
The federal judiciary is not the only self-regulatory entity to raise concerns about
making internal investigations public. See Berst v. Chipman, 653 P.2d 107 (Kan. 1982).
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a self-policing body that regulates
most intercollegiate athletics. In Berst, the NCAA refused to turn ovhr its investigative files
to the Birmingham Post which was sued for libel after it reported on the NCAA's investi-
gation into the recruitment of a player. Id. at 110. The NCAA contended that its 30-year-
old self-policing system depended on the confidentiality of such files and that disclosure
would harm intercollegiate athletics.
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very narrow and discreet investigation will remain so, especially if
the investigating authority finds it necessary to issue subpoenas or
broaden the investigation. 249  Once the accused judge is con-
fronted with information about the investigation, he can probably
identify the participants even without official disclosure.'
The Act also calls for disclosure of the complainant's identity
to additional judges at other stages of the disciplinary process:
when the chief judge appoints a special investigative commit-
tee,"1 when the committee forwards a complete record of its in-
vestigation to the judicial council of the circuit, 2 and when the
judicial council in its discretion refers a complaint together with
the record of the ensuing proceedings to the Judicial Confer-
ence.s The number of judges and court personnel who have
access to confidential information increases with the seriousness of
the complaint. Although the absolute number of those who have
access remains small, the chance for disclosure of the
complainant's identity necessarily increases. The "widespread reluc-
tance" of lawyers to file complaints suggests that practitioners do
not see the Act's confidentiality provisions as effective in prac-
tice. ' Lawyers are more likely to file meritorious complaints
249 The special investigatory committees, judicial councils, and the Judicial Conference
possess full subpoena power. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(9)(A)-(B); see Marcus, supra note 15, at
430 (complaint filed against a chief judge for violating confidentiality provisions by reveal-
ing complainant's identity).
250 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 101.
251 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (4) (B) (The chief judge shall "certify the complaint and any
other documents pertaining thereto to each member of the committee.").
252 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(5) states that:
Each committee appointed under paragraph (4) of this subsection shall conduct
an investigation as extensive as it considers necessary, and shall expeditiously file
a comprehensive written report thereon with the judicial council of the circuit.
Such report shall present both the findings of the investigation and the
committee's recommendations for necessary and appropriate action by the judi-
cial council of the circuit.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (5).
253 "[T]he judicial council may, in its discretion, refer any complaint under this sub-
section, together with the record of any associated proceedings and its recommendation
for appropriate action, to the Judicial Conference of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
372(c) (7) (A).
254 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 100-01 ("This type of risk aversion is
common among those who appear frequently in federal court, notably government law-
yers."); see also Geyh, supra note 8, at 257-58 (suggesting that lawyers, as well as litigants,
jurors, witnesses, the press, court personnel, and fellow judges fear alienating miscreant
judges); Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 148 ("Several chief judges indicated that law-
yers ... are afraid to use [the complaint process] for fear of antagonizing the judicia-
ry.").
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than nonmeritorious complaints, and to the extent that knowl-
edgeable persons with meritorious complaints are unwilling to file
them,25 the Act fails to serve its purpose.
The Judicial Conference may also refer the record of the
disciplinary proceedings to the Clerk of the House of Representa-
fives for consideration of impeachment." Upon receipt of the
determination that impeachment may be warranted, the Clerk of
the House of Representatives must make public the determination
and the record of the associated proceedings.'
Thus, the notion that the Act's confidentiality provisions pro-
tect complainants and other participants from possible retaliation
or unwanted publicity is unsound. More importantly, it is not
entirely clear that participation in the complaint process depends
upon confidentiality, especially for nonlawyers and others not
subject to retaliation.' Furthermore, dropping the Act's broad
shield of confidentiality does not threaten the judiciary's ability to
conduct investigations because it has the authority to subpoena im-
portant evidence." In the final analysis, the notion of efficiency
fails to justify the Act's regime of confidentiality.
255 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 100; see also Geyh, supra note 8, at 258
(chief judges granted authority in 1990 to identify and initiate complaint proceedings
based on information received informally, yet very few complaints were initiated).
256 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (8) (A) states that:
If the Judicial Conference . . . makes its own determination that consideration
of impeachment may be warranted, it shall so certify and transmit the determi-
nation and the record of proceedings to the House of Representatives for what-
ever action the House of Representatives considers to be necessary. Upon receipt
of the determination and record of the proceedings in the House of Representa-
tives, the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall make available to the public
the determination and any reasons for the determination.
(emphasis added).
257 Id. The Act does not make clear whether the Judicial Conference's determination
and associated record of proceedings contains information from earlier stages of the
complaint process-stages in which participants may have conveyed such information with
an expectation that their identities would remain secret.
258 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 101 (implying that confidentiality is un-
necessary if a culture is created and nourished by the bar and the citizenry for "de-
fending lawyers against retaliation from vindictive judges"); see also Marcus, supra note 15,
at 429-30 (noting that generally the complainant's interest in remaining anonymous "is
fairly weak" and that "some complainants have no desire to maintain confidentiality" as
evidenced by those who "call press conferences to trumpet their accusations").
259 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(B).
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C. Experiences of the Fifth Circuit and the Oregon Bar
Proponents of confidentiality have not cited evidence of more
open systems in support of their pessimistic forecasts concerning
judicial independence and efficiency. And indeed, there is evi-
dence that a more open disciplinary system can function well.
From the time when the Act became effective on October 1, 1981
until recently,2" the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit permitted the public direct access to all complaints against
judges as well as to the chief judge's dismissal orders."1 Chief
Judge Charles Clark and his successor, Chief Judge Henry A.
Politz, routinely asked accused judges for their responses to com-
plaints. 2  These responses, along with other evidence, were
placed in a file with the initial complaint and the chief judge's
dismissal order.2" The entire file was available for public exam-
ination."6 The circuit followed this practice because its judges
thought that a policy of "non-access would cause the public to be
suspicious" and because the circuit wanted to show the public that
it was "not hiding anything."2" From 1982, the first year for
260 See id. § 331. The Fifth Circuit no longer provides the public with full access to
judicial complaints and orders as a result of its decision to adopt Illustrative Rule 17.
The circuit was motivated by the Judicial Conference's desire to have one uniform, na-
tional policy regarding dismissal orders by chief judges. Telephone Interview with Henry
A. Politz, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Apr.
25, 1994) [hereinafter Politz Interview].
261 Telephone interview with Charles Clark, former Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (May 4, 1994) [hereinafter Clark Interview]. How-
ever, in accordance with the Act, the Fifth Circuit did not open for public review the
chief judge's orders referring complaints to special investigative committees, the
committees' activities, nor the committees' reports to the judicial council. Nevertheless,
the type of complaints that concern many advocates of confidentiality (the frivolous and
merits-related complaints) were resolved in a nonconfidential manner in the initial stages
of the Act by the chief judges. Both Chief Judge Politz and Clark reported there were
no problems with their circuit's policy of having judicial complaints and their files com-
pletely available to the public in cases where they dismissed the complaints. See also Politz
Interview, supra note 260.
262 Politz Interview, supra note 260; Clark Interview, supra note 261.
263 Politz Interview, supra note 260; Clark Interview, supra note 261.
264 Politz Interview, supra note 260; Clark Interview, supra note 261.
265 See Politz Interview, supra note 260; Clark Interview, supra note 261. Former Chief
Judge Clark served on the three-member Special Committee of the Conference of Chief
Judges of the United States Court of Appeals that prepared the Illustrative Rules. Se
supra notes 110-16 (providing a background discussion of the Illustrative Rules). Rule 17
called for the publication of dismissal orders and for the limited disclosure of the rea-
sons for such orders. Although former Chief Judge Clark and the Fifth Circuit played a
key role in the formulation of Rule 17, they eventually rejected it because it denied the
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which the circuit has statistics, through the end of March 1994, a
total of 279 complaints were filed .21 The chief judges dismissed
approximately ninety percent of these complaints because they
were merits-related, frivolous, not in conformity with the Act, or
because corrective action had occurred.267 Very little publicity re-
sulted.
The open disciplinary process produced neither major contro-
versies regarding individual judges or complainants nor serious
damage to the judiciary's integrity or morale; indeed, citizens only
occasionally requested copies of complaints and orders under the
policy of open access.2ss Public unfamiliarity with the complaint
process in the circuit, especially the right to review complaints and
related materials, may have contributed to this low level of inter-
est.
26a
The Oregon Bar disciplinary process furnishes additional evi-
dence that professional self-regulation can be open without de-
stroying the profession.' Unlike the Fifth Circuit's lawyer disci-
plinary process, which opened only part of the judicial complaint
process to the public,"' Oregon's process is open to the public
from the initial filing of a complaint to its resolution.2' In the
public direct access to complaints, the evidence concerning them, and the original dis-
missal orders. Both Chief Judges Politz and Clark were concerned that Rule 17 precluded
the public from deciding for itself that the circuit had nothing to hide; see Politz Inter-
view, supra note 260; Clark Interview, supra note 261.
266 Telephone Interview with Charles Fulbruge, m, Clerk of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (May 3, 1994).
267 Id.
268 See supra note 260. A Nexis search in the ARCNWS library using the search terms
"fifth circuit w/40 (judicial misconduct or judicial complaints)" supports the chief judges'
conclusions. The search uncovered only four articles regarding judicial misconduct in the
Fifth Circuit. Two of the articles were in national law newspapers, and two were in local
general newspapers. Two of.the articles concerned the same judge.
269 Clark Interview, supra note 261.
270 Telephone Interviews with George Riemer, Associate Executive Director and Gen-
eral Counsel, Oregon State Bar (May 20 & June 29, 1994) [hereinafter Riemer Inter-
views]. Executive Director Riemer reports that since 1976, Oregon has been the only
state with a policy of total openness regarding its lawyer disciplinary process. See Sadler v.
Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218 (Or. 1976).
271 The Fifth Circuit has always kept investigations by special committees confidential
pursuant to § 372(c)(14) of the Act See supra note 261.
272 Public Records and Public Meetings Law, OR. REV. STAT. § 9.010 (1993) (express-
ly subjdcting the state bar to the state Public Records and Public Meetings Law as a
public body); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.420 (1993) ("Every person has a right to inspect any
public record of a public body in this state, except as otherwise expressly provided by
ORS 192.501 to 192.505." (listing exemptions)); OR. BAR R. CIV. P. 1.7(b) (records relat-
ed to bar disciplinary proceedings open for public inspection); see Riemer Interviews,
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recent Tonya Harding controversy, numerous complaints were
filed with the Oregon Bar's Disciplinary Committee against the
lawyer who represented Harding's husband .27  The complaints
followed the lawyer's public comments concerning Harding's in-
volvement in the assault on fellow skater Nancy Kerrigan 4.2 ' The
openness of the disciplinary process did not produce a wave of
frivolous complaints by the public or by the bar.' On the con-
trary, complaints from both sources expressed sensible concern
about the propriety of the attorney's remarks.Y
The McKay Commission, which the ABA established in 1989
to study lawyer disciplinary systems, provides additional evidence
that Oregon's open disciplinary system is effective. 7  Based in
supra note 270 (indicating that the public occasionally learns about complaints even be-
fore the accused attorney). See generally Open the Process, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 25, 1994, at A16
(noting that secret disciplinary processes for lawyers have harmed the profession's reputa-
tion and that recapturing the public's trust requires that disciplinary systems should be
open from the filing of a complaint, as in Oregon and Florida).
Recognizing a strong public interest in obtaining knowledge about its judges, a
federal court recently struck down a Florida law prohibiting complainants from publicly
discussing their testimony in state judicial disciplinary proceedings. Doe v. Florida Judicial
Qualifications Comm'n, 748 F. Supp. 1520, 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1990); see also Baugh v. Judi-
cial Inquiry and Review Comm'n, 907 F.2d 440, 444-45 (4th Cir. 1990) (deciding that
only a compelling state interest could justify Virginia's confidentiality regulation which
prohibited complainants from publicly reporting that they had filed judicial complaints).
See generally Lind v. Grimmez, 30 F.Sd 1115, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that indi-
vidual has First Amendment right to disclose that he filed a complaint with Hawaii's
Campaign Spending Commission and rejecting the Commission's justifications for confi-
dentiality- the Commission's justifications were similar to those advanced by proponents of
the Act's confidentiality).
273 Randall Sullivan, Tonya Harding, ROLLING STONE, July 14-28, 1994, at 80 (provid-
ing a detailed account of the incident).
274 Id. at 113.
275 See Riemer Interviews, supra note 270. Executive Director Riemer reports that
while no disciplinary system is completely problem-free, the benefits of Oregon's open
disciplinary system clearly outweigh its detriments. The openness has promoted public
confidence in the lawyer self-disciplinary process. See also Telephone Interview with James
Mass, Legal Counsel for the Oregon Supreme Court and the Oregon Court of Appeals
(May 20, 1994) (indicating that Oregon's open disciplinary process has been beneficial in
promoting public confidence in the bar's self-regulation). See generally Merton, supra note
241.
276 See David Margolick, Of Tonya, Jeff and the Price Demanded for a Lawyer's Finger-Point-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at B18; see also Russell Sadler, MEDFORD [OR.] MAIL TRIB.,
Apr. 10, 1994, at All (noting as incorrect the prevailing wisdom in Oregon approximate-
ly 20 years ago that the public disciplining of lawyers would produce media trials and
"election-year dirty tricks and besmirched reputations"; noting also that in 1990 the state
bar president recommended Oregon's public disciplinary process to ABA). See generally
Open the Process, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25, 1994, at A16 (urging states to make their lawyer
disciplinary processes more public).
277 COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AM. BAR ASs'N, LAWYER
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part on the Oregon experience, the McKay Commission proposed
an open disciplinary system in its 1992 report to the ABA House
of Delegates .2 ' The commission recommended that disciplinary
matters be made public from the time of the complainant's initial
contact with a disciplinary body.2' Although the commission ulti-
mately withdrew the proposal because of opposition, it neverthe-
less underscores the commission's appreciation of and preference
for an open disciplinary process.m
Opening the Act's complaint process will not produce a result
any different from that witnessed in the analogous context of the
Oregon Bar."ss Indeed, the Fifth Circuit's experience indicates
that the result will be the same. And there is some reason to be
concerned with the risk that the Act's broad shroud of secrecy
may be perceived as just another coverup by a profession at the
public's expense.2
D. Accountability, Public Perception and Openness
Even if the Act's confidentiality offers some protection for
REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 34-39 (1992) [hereinafter MCKAY REPORT].
278 See Mary M. Devlin, Historical Overiew: The Development of Lanyer Disciplinay Proce-
dures in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 931-32 (1994) (reporting that the
McKay Commission based its recommendation for an open disciplinary system on the
experiences of West Virginia, Florida, and Oregon).
279 See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 277, at 39; see also Devlin, supra note 278, at 932
(reporting that disciplinary hearings in 31 states are currently public).
280 See Devlin, supra note 278, at 932.
281 Like the legal profession from which the federal judiciary is culled, judges are
public servants who are accountable to all citizens. See generally ROSCOE POUND, THE LAW-
YER FROM ANTIQUrIY TO MODERN TIMES Wirr PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1953). Pound states that "[t]he legal
profession is a public profession. Lawyers are public servants. They are stewards of all the
rights and obligations of all the citizens. It is incumbent on stewards, if they are to be
faithful to their trust, to render an accounting from time to time." Id. at vii.
282 See Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218, 1227 (Or. 1976). Writing for the
majority, Justice McAllister opined:
To strike down the Public Records [exception] would give special treatment to
attorneys and perhaps encourage the public belief that a veil of secrecy is hiding
professional misconduct. Opening up the files of the Bar to the public may
restore confidence in the integrity of the individual attorney and assure those
concerned that the profession is truly committed to maintaining the highest le-
gal ethics.
See also State er rel. Frohnmayer v. Oregon State Bar, 767 P.2d 893 (Or. 1989) (holding,
first, that the state bar's denial of public access to disciplinary records is reviewable by
the Oregon Attorney General to see if the records are exempt under the Public Records
Law and, second, that the Attorney General's decision is appealable to the circuit court).
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judicial independence, this is not the only value at stake in the
judicial discipline process. 21 Public accountability of judges, a
countervailing value, must also be weighed when assessing the
Act's effectiveness.284 Indeed, Congress was principally concerned
with assuring public accountability in the Act, which has its roots
in the 1970s-a time of heightened concern over accountability of
government officials in general.SS
Questions persist about the extent of misconduct in the feder-
al judiciary and the effectiveness of the available regulatory mecha-
nisms.286 The Act's broad shroud of secrecy denies the public im-
portant information about the internal disciplinary workings of the
judiciary2 7 and prevents the public from making its own assess-
ment about the state of judicial affairs.SS Even the NCJDR noted
its "apprehensi[on] that the notion of confidentiality can assume a
life of its own, at great cost to public accountability. " 9
One expert on judicial discipline recently wrote, "[T]he per-
ception persists that judges cannot be trusted to judge themselves
[because] the public sees lots of judges and little formal disciplin-
ary action."' This perception is particularly troublesome because
the public is precluded from evaluating the dismissals of ninety-
283 Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 173-78.
284 See Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 126-28 (noting that "[t]he Act does not
address most of the tension between the [competing] goals 'oversight and
confidentiality'").
285 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 4; see Marcus, supra note 15, at 375.
286 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 123-27; see also Seventh Circuit Evaluation,
supra note 7, at 716-19 (criticizing the chief judge and the circuit judicial council for not
fulfilling their responsibilities under the Act to investigate and discipline judges, even
after the Chicago Council of Lawyers identified judges who may have engaged in miscon-
duct). See generally Grimes, supra note 30, at 1220-23. Although "the Act has yet to prove
itself as a reliable tool for dealing with the more serious judicial misconduct traditionally
addressed through a House impeachment investigation," id. at 1223, its "mechanism offers
hope of addressing the vast majority of disciplinary problems that do not warrant remov-
al," id. at 1222.
287 The confluence of three sections shields information-frivolous as well as
nonfrivolous-from public purview. § 372(c) (3) vests the chief judge with broad discre-
tion to dismiss a complaint, § 372(c)(13) prohibits third party intervention in disciplinary
proceedings, and § 372(c)(14) mandates total confidentiality during the Act's complaint
process. See supra text accompanying notes 158-76.
288 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
289 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 106.
290 See Geyh, supra note 8, at 309 (contending that the judiciary engages in signifi-
cant informal and less visible disciplinary activity); see also Abrams, supra note 20, at 95
(noting that most complalhts are privately resolved by chief judges and that the confi-
dentiality of these resolutions does "not really satisfy the goals of public accountability").
See generally DERSHOWITZ, supra note 7, at 17-19 (contending the quality of the judiciary is
inferior to many other democratic nations because of the political appointment process).
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five percent of the complaints filed against judges. Instead, it is
forced to rely on the assessment of the NCJDR and others regard-
ing the effectiveness of the Act." In addition to these third-par-
ty assessments, the public may soon be able to rely on a sanitized
summary of the reasons for complaint dismissals from all cir-
cuits-with the chief judge excising the names of the accused
judge and complainant. 2 Nevertheless, the public is still prevent-
ed from directly reviewing the complaint file and thereby drawing
its own conclusions." s
This problematic perception may be exacerbated by any de-
cline in the quality of justice dispensed by the federal courts. One
veteran circuit judge recently cautioned Congress that "time is of
the essence" for finding a "radical" way to expand the federal
judiciary to cope with its ever-increasing docket.' The judge re-
ported that cases all too often get "second-class treatment" and
that other judges share his dire view that there is a continuing
291 The excellent FJC field study conducted by Jeffrey N. Barr and Thomas Willging
is very helpful in assessing the number and nature of complaints and the general reason
for their disposition. See Barr & Willging, supra note 7. They examined 469 of the 2,405
complaints filed from the beginning of the Act through the calendar year of 1991. They
reviewed complaints in eight of the twelve appellate circuits. Id. at 30-31. Although they
did not interview all former chief judges or other court personnel, such as circuit execu-
tives or clerks, they did interview the current chief judges in all eight circuits as well .as
former chief judges in five of the circuits. Id. at 30. In addition to the Barr & Wiging
study, another NCJDR consultant, Professor Richard L Marcus, reviewed approximately
1175 dismissal orders, involving slightly less than half of the complaints filed during the
period (1981-92) studied by the NCJDR. See also Marcus, supra note 15, at 376.
292 See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text; Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at
127.
294 See Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts-Too Few Judges, Too Many
Cases, A.BA. J., Jan. 1993, 52, 52-54; see also KRONMAN, supra note 5, at 320-25 (noting a
great increase in the number of cases which some describe as a "'caseload crisis'");
American Judicature Soc'y Comm'n, Opening up Federal Judicial Discipline, 78 JUDiCATURE 4
(1994) (predicting that "[b]urgeoning caseloads, increased expenditures, and escalating
crime lead to serious concerns about the efficacy of our" justice system, including its
judicial disciplinary procedures, and that "opening" the system to public participation is
necessary for retaining an effective and independent judicial system); Jon 0. Newman, Re-
'structuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L
REV. 761, 762-67 (1989) (asserting that the increase in federal caseload threatens the
quality of federal judiciary); cf. William H. Rhenquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 571, 575-76 (1994) (emphasizing that federal courts "re-
main overloaded with cases, especially considering that many [are] operating with staff
levels less than 85 percent of the strength authorized by law"; noting, however, a modest
decrease in the level of trial-court filings). See generally, Geyh, supra note 245, at 513-19
(examining the reasons for delay in judicial decision-making and concluding that the in-
crease in caseload is not the only reason).
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decline in the quality of the work of the federal judiciary." A
1993 report by the Justice Research Institute (JRI Report) for the
NCJDR found that even judges acknowledged that "valid com-
plaints are not filed," although the number of unfiled complaints
cannot be known.s
The anticipated growth of the federal judiciary and the appe-
tite of Americans for litigation are likely to ensure a steady stream
of judicial complaints. 7 Limiting the public's knowledge about
judicial performance prevents the public from being certain that
justice is being administered fairly and efficiently. In a perverse
way, if the complainant and the accused judge follow the Act, it
effectively serves as a prior restraint by broadly denying the public
information that is critical of public servants." By largely insulat-
ing judges from public scrutiny, Congress may undermine the very
purpose of the Act-to provide for the fair and efficient admin-
istration of justice and, according to some, to provide the public
with access to avenues of judicial discipline.'
A disciplinary process more open to public review would im-
prove the public's perception of judicial self-regulation and, in the
long term, prevent the courts from becoming less accountable to
or separate from the public." Evidence of this separateness is
295 Reinhardt, supra note 294, at 52. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIs AND REFORM 7, 77-93 (1985) (describing the caseload crisis in economic
terms and noting that the demand for judicial services has outstripped the supply).
296 See Slate, supra note 206, at 1021-22 (stating that a representative sample of 306
judges of the United States Court of Appeals, U.S. District Courts, Bankruptcy and Magis-
trate Courts participated in the survey).
297 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at ii, 4; supra notes 294-96 and accompany-
ing text.
298 See Edwards, supra note 16, at 792-93. Complainants and witnesses often ignore
the Act's mandate of confidentiality and publicize their testimony. See Marcus, supra note
15, at 427 n.175. One chief judge stated:
As I now read the statute and rules, either party is free to breach confidenti-
ality. Certainly [the] complainant is; probably the judge is equally free .... I'd
like to make it clear in the Rules that either [the] complainant or the judge
has the right to respond publicly once confidentiality is breached by the other
side.
Id.; see also Doe v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, 748 F. Supp. 1520, 1529 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) (holding that complainants have a constitutional right to publicly communicate
the fact that a complaint has been filed).
299 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 ("Congress was principally concerned
with assuring public accountability in the 1980 Act ... ."); see also Edwards, supra note
16, at 793 (criticizing the Act as an "ill-conceived" Congressional statutory procedure "to
cure a perceived need for public access to avenues of judicial discipline" (citing Judge
Browning, Report on the Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980 in the Ninth Judicial Circuit 4 n.3 (Oct. 21, 1987))).
300 -See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 109-10; see also CAPPELLEr, supra note
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reflected in the recent JRI Report which found that "[t]he public
virtually has no knowledge or easy access to information about the
judicial complaint process."" A judiciary that is too separate
from the "democratic order" may interfere with "democratic corn-
mitments to majority rule." 2
If the disciplinary process is open from the time a complaint
is filed, some individual judges, like other public servants, may
suffer from frivolous and mean-spirited claims of misconduct. Yet
the Supreme Court recognizes that the public's criticism of an
official's conduct does not become unworthy of constitutional
protection just because it diminishes the official's reputation."
Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted the strong public interest in
obtaining knowledge about judges and has stated that judges "are
not anointed priests"' deserving special protection from public
12, at 102. The Act's limitation on citizen access to information about judges also poses
a more sinister danger-the "separateness of the judiciary," which enables it to become a
"corps se'par'e aloof and irresponsive to the overall system of government and society." Id.
A possible manifestation of the judiciary's aloofness is the unwillingness or inability of
some chief judges to involve others in the process of reviewing and disposing of com-
plaints, even though the Act does not expressly prohibit the involvement. See Barr &
Willging, supra note 7, at 69; see also KRONMAN, supra note 5, at 351 (noting that judges
have distanced themselves from the pathos of conflict by giving law clerks greater involve-
ment in deciding cases---encouraging a spirit of separatism"). Another related example is
the refusal of some chief judges to provide written reasons for the dismissal of a com-
plaint. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Lim-
its on Judges Learning, Speaking and Acting-Part I-Tentative First Thoughts: How May Judges
Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 539, 543 (1994) (encouraging judges "to participate in activities
that examine and improve the judiciary and legal process" [and warning them that]
-"[i]solation is certainly not desirable").
301 See Slate, supra note 206, at 959-63. The JRI Report found that there was a gen-
eraI need to educate all of the groups that participated in its survey-federal appellate
and district judges, all appellate and district clerks, attorneys, citizens, and journalists. Id.
at 1022; see also TwTwrlEm CENTuRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 109 (public awareness of
the Act is not widespread and prevents it from being "truly effective"); The Effects of Gen-
der in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S.
CAL L. REV. 963, 986-87 (1994) (hereinafter The Effects of Gender] (discussing the need to
prohibit gender-biased behavior in the courts, the Task Force emphasized the importance
of developing complaint procedures and "widely disseminatfingi" information about such
mechanisms to litigants, lawyers, staff, and public (emphasis added)).
302 Fiss, supra note 180, at 62-67.
303 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)); see Lynne M. Reardon, Actual Malice: A High Price
For Fame 5 (May 2, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
304 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978) (citing
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941)); see also Doe v. Florida Judicial Qualifi-
cations Comm'n, 748 F. Supp. 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (state bar rule barring complainant
from disclosing information regarding disciplinary proceedings invalidated as violating
constitutional right to free speech); Baugh v. Judicial Inquiry Review Comm'n, 907 F.2d
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criticism.ss"
Preserving judicial independence and protecting judges' priva-
cy and reputations from unfounded complaints are legitimate
governmental interests."0 6 Yet proponents of confidentiality have
not demonstrated that judicial independence is possible only if the
Act's disciplinary process remains largely confidential and closed to
public participation. Nor have they demonstrated that the risks of
a more open process clearly outweigh the public's competing
interest in having direct access to information about judicial con-
duct upon the initial filing of a complaint alleging judicial miscon-
duct. Even assuming that some individual judges will be harmed
by the public airing of nonmeritorious complaints, 7 a funda-
mental policy choice concerning secrecy and openness has to be
made, and it ought to favor disclosure."°
IV. OPENING THE ACT: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Congress should consider several changes to the Act to bolster
the public's perception of judicial self-regulation and to enhance
public accountability. First, it should amend the Act to make the
entire complaint process open to public review." The amend-
ment should clearly express Congress' intent to promote public
accountability by providing the public with full access to com-
plaints, pertinent evidence, and final orders except under extraor-
dinary circumstances. Extraordinary circumstances might include
440 (4th Cir. 1990).
305 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (noting that public offi-
dais assume greater risk of being subjected to public scrutiny).
306 See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 419.
307 The FJC Study suggests that providing the public with full access to judicial com-
plaint files may be more of a risk in certain regions of the country where the media
allegedly has a more voracious appetite for judicial complaints. See Marcus, supra note 15,
at 427. Even if the media in certain regions did report nonmeritorious complaints, this is
an insufficient reason to impose a blanket rule of confidentiality on all circuit councils.
308 See Keyt, supra note 189, at 985 (suggesting that an "independent and honorable
judiciary" is best served by openness and accountability).
309 But see Marcus, supra note 15, at 430 (describing as "overblown" the notion that
the public has an interest in "making all aspects of the discipline process public").
Although complete openness would be the ideal, there are alternatives to opening
fully the Act's process overnight. For example, one alternative would be to apply the
openness provisions only to judges who are appointed after the provisions are adopted.
This alternative would respond to concerns that a completely open regime should not
apply to judges appointed under a regime of confidentiality. Moreover, the approach
would gradually introduce the new "openness" to the judiciary and the public, provide a
transitional period to fine-tune the provisions, and reduce the likelihood that the courts
would confront a sudden surge of frivolous complaints.
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those instances in which disclosure of information in a complaint
threatens national security, endangers someone's life, or involves
juveniles. 10 In such extraordinary circumstances, the chief judge
or the judicial council should have discretion to impose the kind
of confidentiality the Act now mandates. The extraordinary cir-
cumstances exception to the Act's policy of openness should be
construed narrowly and should require a showing of clear and
convincing evidence."'
Opening the entire process would promote judicial morale
because it would significantly undermine any allegations of a cov-
erup of judicial misconduct. In addition, judges would no longer
be disadvantaged by the fact that complainants are free to dissemi-
nate information publicly while the judges feel duty bound by
both their Code of Conduct and the Act to remain silent 1 2
Surely, an open disciplinary process would provide judges with a
more level playing field for vindicating their interests before the
public.3 13
Second, if Congress rejects opening the entire complaint
process, it should nevertheless amend § 372(c)(14) of the Act to
open special committee investigations to public review unless ex-
traordinary circumstances warrant confidentiality.1 4 Once a com-
plaint has reached this stage, the chief judge has determined that
further investigation is necessary because the complaint is not
merits-related or frivolous and that neither corrective action nor
intervening events permit the chief judge to conclude the pro-
310 See, e.g., Daniel B. Silver, The Uses and Misuses of Intelligence Oversigh 11 Hous. j.
INT'L L. 7, 9 (1988) (noting that "[d]espite the vigor with which public debate and polit-
ical action are pursued in some areas of government activity, there seems to be a wide-
spread enduring consensus in our society that functions necessary to the security of the
United States can, and should be, conducted in secret whenever it is necessary to their
success").
311 This intermediate standard of persuasion should limit the availability of the ex-
traordinary circumstances exception and is thus commensurate with the importance of
having an open process to ensure public accountability. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (as a safeguard against chilling First Amendment expression,
clear and convincing evidence of actual malice required before granting public figure
recovery in defamation action against a media defendant).
312 See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text. But see Marcus, supra note 15, at
427 n.175 (quoting one chief judge: "the sense of the statutory scheme is that it's all
confidential . . . . I think that's clear now;, complainants know that leaks are improper.").
313 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 427 n.175 (quoting one chief judge: "I'd like to
make it clear in the Rules that either [the] complainant or the judge has the right to
respond publicly once confidentiality is breached by the other side.'").
314 See supra notes 173-76, 309-310 and accompanying text.
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ceeding. The public's interest in accountability outweighs the com-
peting confidentiality concerns of the accused judge that his repu-
tation is being unjustifiably placed at risk. If Congress refuses to
open the special committee investigations, then at the very least
Congress should make clear that § 372(c) (14)'s confidentiality pro-
vision applies only to the investigations of the special committee
and does not function as a general rule of confidentiality for the
-entire Act. 15
Third, the Judicial Conference recently adopted Illustrative
Rule 17 as national policy."1 6 It is therefore no longer acceptable
for chief judges to write only brief conclusory statements in sup-
port of their dismissal orders in hopes of complying with the Act's
goal of public accountability.3 7 This is an important positive
step, yet Rule 17 requires chief judges to redact the name of both
the accused judge and the complainant--in effect, providing a
sanitized version of the record. Not all judges are enthusiastic
about the Rule's adoption, and it is uncertain how effective this
policy will be in informing the public, especially given the omis-
sion of the names of the accused judge and the complainant.5 1 9
The success of the Rule depends largely on the willingness of
chief judges to provide sufficient information in support of their
dismissal orders. Congress should amend § 372(c) to require that
all chief judges' disciplinary orders be public and be accompanied
by sufficient information for meaningful public evaluation. To
ensure full implementation of Rule 17, the amendment should
315 This would be consistent with the NCJDR's position that the Act's confidentiality
provisions be construed narrowly. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 107.
316 See supra note 170.
317 See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 8, at 108 ("Seven of the twelve complaint dismissals identified as troublesome by
the Commission's consultants . . . relied on form dismissals that [did] not articulate
reasons for the stated conclusions.").
318 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 107; see also TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT,
supra note 2, at 104-12 (discussing Illustrative Rules 16 and 17 and the Act's confidential-
ity); supra note 169 and accompanying text. For the Fifth Circuit, the adoption of Illus-
trative Rule 17 for resolving judicial complaints represents an additional efficiency cost
because the chief judge must prepare a sanitized version of the complaint, the record,
and the order. Before Rule 17's adoption, all matters associated with a complaint, such
as papers and other evidence, were directly available to the public in unedited form in
the Fifth Circuit. See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.
319 For a sample of chief judges' views concerning the need for a confidential com-
plaint process, see Marcus, supra note 15, at 427 n.175. One chief judge remarked, "'[I]f
the complaints were public, that could do a lot of damage, it could undermine public
respect for the judiciary. As for issuing public, but sanitized, chief judge orders of dis-
missals, I don't know what purpose that would serve." Id.
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require that the Judicial Conference establish a committee with
both lawyers and lay persons to evaluate annually circuit compli-
ance with Rule 17 in light of the Act's goal of public ac-
countability. 2°
Fourth, Congress should amend § 372(c)(13) of the Act to
permit amicus curiae participation,321 which would provide the
judiciary with valuable information for resolving individual cases of
misconduct and for addressing more systemic matters."S Amicus
curiae intervention will be easier and more effective if Congress
also amends § 372(c) or § 372(c)(14) to provide the public with
greater access to information about alleged misconduct. Even if it
does not amend these sections, however, amicus curiae participa-
tion is appropriate. Although it may entail some costs, such as the
time judges spend considering additional briefs, the potential
benefits of additional insight concerning judicial discipline out-
320 Some have suggested that the responsibilities of an oversight committee be ex-
tended beyond overseeing Rule 17 compliance to cover all judicial implementation of the
Act. Although this may seem like an attractive compromise between complete openness
and the Act's current regime of secrecy, it should not be viewed as a substitute for a
truly open disciplinary process. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 61 ("Oversight is
not without problems. . . . [I]t can be too intrusive [and] it may not be sufficiently
comprehensive."). Furthermore, some judges are concerned about creating a separate and
central oversight organization because it might threaten judicial independence. See COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 61, 123. It may also undermine judicial morale and
discourage judicial candidates. Furthermore, in an "age of fiscal restraint," the creation of
another governmental organization may be politically unpopular, especially since there is
no guarantee that such a commission will necessarily satisfy the need for accountability.
See id. at 66 (reporting that no new governmental bodies are necessary to conduct addi-
tional study and oversight of judicial self-regulation because existing institutions-such as
congressional committees and the Judicial Conference-are adequate). Moreover, there is
a substantial risk that instead of building public confidence in the judiciary, the oversight
committee may be perceived as just an extension of the judiciary-judges "watching"
fellow judges. As an interim measure, however, an oversight committee might provide
some reassurance that judges are engaging in self-discipline and constitute a logical step
toward a fully open disciplinary process.
321 See supra notes 149-51, 172 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Michi-
gan, 940 F.2d 143, 163-64 (6th Cir. 1991) (opining that amicus curiae interposition in a
judicial proceeding serves the public interest by providing the courts with "impartial
information' on matters of law about which there is doubt"); Michael K. Lowman, The
Litigating Amicus Curiae: Wen Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L
REV. 1243, 1244-46 (1992) (reporting that the amicus curiae can provide the judiciary
with impartial and valuable information and advice, especially given the ever-increasing
complexity of cases).
322 For a recent example of when amicus curiae intervention in judicial disciplinary
matters might be beneficial, see FBI Investigates a Nev. Judge Inquiry, NAT'L .J, April 18,
1994, at A6, A13 (udicial disciplinary hearing stayed by Nevada state justice prompts
"request from director of Association of Judicial Disciplinary Counsel in New York to in-
tervene in the case by filing an amicus curiae brief").
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weigh any competing efficiency concerns.ss The Act's absolute
ban on amicus curiae participation is too broad and arguably
inconsistent with the goal of increased public accountability. 24 At
a minimum, Congress should amend the Act to provide the chief
judge or judicial council with discretion to permit amicus curiae
participation.
Fifth, Congress should amend the Act to give the courts juris-
diction to discipline judges who have resigned or retired before or
after the filing of a complaint. Such an amendment, already the
practice in several states and recommended by the drafters of the
new ABA Proposed Model Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Enforce-
ment," will reassure the public that miscreant judges will nei-
ther escape sanction nor receive generous job-related benefits
merely because they leave office quickly and quietly.-26 Extending
the Act's reach to cover departed judges will also promote full
compliance by active judges with the Code of Judicial Ethics and
the Act.
Sixth, if Congress refuses to extend the Act's disciplinary juris-
diction to cover departed judges, it should nevertheless amend the
Act to require disclosure of any complaint pending at the time a
judge resigns or retires. The official designation of "retirement (or
resignation) while complaint pending" may cause some judges to
challenge allegations of misconduct rather than leave office volun-
tarily. Nevertheless, the public's interest in knowing about judicial
departures under these circumstances warrants the designation and
outweighs competing efficiency concerns.s27
Finally, Congress should amend the Act to involve citizens in
323 The benefits of amicus curiae participation in dispute resolution have been long
acknowledged by the Supreme Court. See Karen O'Conner & Lee Epstein, Reforming Ami-
cus Curiae Rules, 8 JusT. SYS. J. 35 (1983) (Supreme Court finds the benefits of amicus
curiae briefs outweigh their impact on an already crowded docket). Both "public interest"
and "judicial administration" would be similarly benefitted by amending the Act to permit
amicus participation. Id. at 45.
324 See generally Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952). Justice Felix Frankfurter
condemned the solicitor general's blanket denial of motions to file amicus curiae briefs
when the government was a party as "not conducive to the wise disposition of the
Court's business." Id. at 942.
325 See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text. Rule 2B(2) of the ABA Proposed
Rules requires that complaints against former judges be filed "within one year following
the last day of the judge's service." ABA PROPOSED JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note
179, Rule 2B(2) commentary. A similar statute of limitations should be adopted for filing
complaints against former federal judges. The period for filing federal complaints, howev-
er, should be longer given the public interest at stake.
326 See supra notes 231-34, 237-39 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
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the disciplinary process. 2 Citizen participation should not be
viewed as an unnecessary interference in an elite profession, but
rather as a potential source of public assistance and supports3 9
The recent JRI Report indicates significant support for the involve-
ment of lawyers and lay persons in the judicial disciplinary pro-
cess.- Even seventeen percent of the judges surveyed in this re-
port favored establishing an independent national commission for
judicial discipline which would include both lawyers and lay per-
sons as members.3
The Act presents several opportunities for public participation.
For example, the chief judge could appoint a representative of the
bar and a member of the public to serve as a standing committee
to assist him in screening complaints before either dismissing
them or appointing a special investigative committee. Another
alternative is for the chief judge to appoint citizens to special
investigative committees. Both alternatives still provide the local
circuits with primary authority for disciplining fellow judges-a
structure that some judges regard as preferable to the creation of
a national tribunal. 32 Citizen participation at some stage in the
judicial discipline process is consistent with the goals of judicial
independence and integrity because it promotes public apprecia-
tion of and respect for judicial decisionmaking.333 Ideally, any
328 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 152 (recommending "that each circuit
council charge a committee or committees, broadly representative of the bar but that
may also include lay persons . . . to assist in the presentation to the chief judge of seri-
ous complaints against federal judges" (emphasis added)). Although this recommendation
is permissive, a standing committee of the American Judicature Society has wisely suggest-
ed that it is in the self-interest of the judiciary to "insist" on including lay participation
because it reduces the risk of public alienation and mistrust of the judicial system. See
American Judicature Soc'y Comm'n, supra note 294; see also The Effects of Gender, supra
note 301, at 991 (recommending that the Ninth Circuit create a standing committee on
fairness to fight gender bias in the courts and that the committee be composed of indi-
viduals of sufficient diversity, including "non-lawyer representatives").
329 See generally SHAMAN ET AL, supra note 17, at 6 (citing I. TESITOR & D. SINS,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 28-39 (2d ed. 1980) (suggesting that nonjudges already
sit on many state judicial conduct commissions)).
330 See Slate, supra note 206, at 1023-24.
331 See id.; c. Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 174-75 (noting that several chief judg-
es thought that a national court or citizen tribunal "might impinge on judicial indepen-
dence" if selected as an alternative to the Act which focuses disciplinary control in local
circuits).
332 See Barr & Willging, supra note 7, at 174-75 (reporting that several chief judges
perceived a threat to judicial independence if disciplinary power "goes outside the circuit
to some national body" causing the administration of complaints to "become formal,
literal, and bureaucratic").
333 All states and the District of Columbia have judicial conduct commissions, six
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congressional effort to increase openness under the Act by provid-
ing for limited citizen participation' should be combined with a
campaign to educate the public about judicial activities.3 5 The
judicial councils should follow the NCJDR's suggestion of under-
taking a campaign to educate the public about the Act and to
publicize its existence.s' Members of the public should have di-
rect input and representation on any judicial committee charged
with informing the public about the Act.
CONCLUSION
The goal of the proposed -amendments is to open the Act's
disciplinary process to the public-to democratize the process by
providing for public involvement and review in the formulation
and implementation of judicial discipline. By opening the process,
Congress may prevent what Judge Abner Mikva recently noted as
states have a majority of public members, and only three have no nonlawyer public mem-
bers. SHAMAN Er AL., supra note 17, at 382-83. These commissions function as investigato-
ry bodies with broad authority. Id. at 384; see, e.g., CAL. CONST. amend. XXX, § 1 (de-
fining the California Commission on Judicial Performance as an independent body over-
seeing the conduct of all state judges, composed of five judges selected by the supreme
court, two lawyers chosen by the state bar, and two members of the public appointed by
the governor and confirmed by the senate); cf. American Judicature Soc'y Comm'n, supra
note 294 (reporting that the ABA recommends lay person participation on judicial con-
duct commissions and that every state commission include nonlawyers, sometimes con-
stituting a majority).
334 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 126 (recommending that the member-
ship of the Judicial Conference's Committee to Review Council Conduct and Disability
Orders, which monitors judicial discipline legislation and serves as a clearing house
among circuits, be expanded to include lawyers as well as former circuit and district chief
judges).
335 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 99-100 (noting "widespread ignorance
about the Act in virtually every respondent group and a widely shared perception that
some meritorious complaints are never filed"); see also supra notes 268-69 and accompany-
ing text (suggesting that the Fifth Circuit's legacy of openness shows that even an open
complaint process requires educating the public about the Act if public interest is to oc-
cur). One possible method for bridging the informational gap between the public and
the courts is to have court personnel, perhaps the clerk, distribute press releases about
the activities of the court. Like other institutions that depend on public trust, the courts
should cultivate channels for the distribution of information. Any information campaign
should begin by reaching back to primary and secondary schools.
336 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 152 (recommending that the "bar and
the federal judiciary increase awareness of and education about the 1980 Act among
[various groups, including the] public"); see also TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note
2, at 87-88 (citing public awareness as the linchpin of the 1980 Act, the Task Force sug-
gested more education for "consumers" of judicial services: for example, giving each lit-
igant a brief written summary of the Act or circulating the Act and other proposed rules
to the bar and other interested groups for comments).
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the tendency "of some of my colleagues on the bench [to] forget
that the courts are a public institution. The public interest has to
predominate over any private interest."337
The NCJDR notes in its recent and excellent report that judi-
cial self-discipline under the Act appears to be functioning "rea-
sonably well [but also that] it is by no means a perfect sys-
tem."' The NCJDR also notes that it does not regard the con-
clusions and recommendations in the report as the final word on
judicial self-regulation.3 9
In the spirit of the NCJDR Report, this article has attempted
to further the dialogue about accountability and independence in
the federal judiciary by suggesting that Congress lift the Act's veil
of secrecy. The public benefit from full and open access to the
disciplinary process outweighs any independence or efficiency
concerns that seem to militate in favor of a confidential process.
Indeed, an open process promises to serve both the judiciary's
long-term interest in maintaining its independence and integrity
and the public's interest in preserving governmental accountability
and democratic rule.'
More importantly, without complete information about the
filing of complaints and the reasons for their disposition, the pub-
lic is denied the opportunity to evaluate judges fully. Indeed, the
337 Marianne Lavelle, Hearings Reveal Deep Divisions over the Issue of Court Secrety, NAT'L
UJ., May 2, 1994, at A12. Judge Mikva's remark was part of his testimony before the
United States Senate Subcommittee on Courts which examined the risks associated with
the practice of settling complaints secretly. He urged Congress to establish guidelines for
judicial approval of secret settlements in order to safeguard the public's interest. For
example, it was suggested that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would have kept
silicone breast implants on the market in 1991 but for a doctor presenting the FDA
Commissioner with copies of protected court documents that showed evidence of "'scien-
tific fraud'" and other problems associated with the implants. Id. For a possibly ominous
sign concerning the judiciary's general disposition toward openness, see generally Henry
J. Reske, No More Camera in Federal Courts, A.B.. J., Nov. 1994, 28 (reporting that after a
twenty minute debate the Judicial Conference reinstituted its ban on television cameras in
the courtroom, despite considerable support by judges, lawyers and others for expanding
broadcast access).
338 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 123.
339 See id. at 129. In concluding its fine efforts, the NCJDR stated: "[T]he Commis-
sion realizes that the last pages in these particular chapters of constitutional history and
judicial administration may not have been written. Others, either in the near or the dis-
tant future, may feel differently than we. This is as it should be; the Constitution is, after
all, a living document." Id.
340 See Hazard, supra note 208. See generally Fiss, supra note 180, at 60 ("Although
some degree of political independence is necessary, removing the judiciary from popular
control might well interfere with democratic vAlues.").
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public is unable to make an informed assessment of the Act itself,
including Congress' decision in the first instance to grant the
judiciary almost absolute self-regulatory authority."s
341 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 390-91, 431 (arguing that the shroud of confiden-
tiality surrounding the Act's complaint process prevents the public from crediting the
judiciary for its disciplinary efforts and makes it difficult to assess whether the public's
perception of the judiciary has improved). See generally SHAMAN ET AL, supra note 17, at
417-18. No state judicial disciplinary system permits public access to complaints before
they are evaluated for probable cause, and complaints dismissed for a lack of probable
cause remain unavailable to the public. Currently, 22 states permit the public to review
complaints and other information in files after an investigation results in formal charges.
Id. at 417. Nineteen states permit public disclosure after a formal hearing and when
discipline is recommended to the supreme court, and nine states permit public disclosure
only if the supreme court issues sanctions. Id.
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